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ABSTRACT 
This research modeled and simulated the KC-135 aircraft's Programmed Depot 
Maintenance (PDM) Flight Controls Repair Cell to identify improvement opportunities 
for greater efficiency within the flight controls repair process.  PDM is conducted by the 
564th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 76th Aircraft Maintenance Group, Oklahoma City 
Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC), Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  The researchers 
focused on the repair cell's internal formal and informal communication flows and 
information processing to evaluate the impact on flight controls repair throughput time.  
Computational organizational modeling was employed to examine organizational design 
modifications and their effect on repair cycle-time, project cost, and project risk.  The 
modeling and simulation software used is based upon organizational design theory and 
information-processing research.  To build the baseline organizational model that 
emulated the actual repair process, the researchers collected data through interviews with 
repair cell personnel and through observation of the repair process.  Modifications called 
''interventions" were developed to simulate and analyze organizational design changes.  
The study concludes with the recommendation of feasible organizational design 
alternatives for OC-ALC decision-makers to improve the flight controls repair process 
and throughput time. 
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The 564th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (564 AMXS) is a unit assigned to the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) and is responsible for the United States 
Air Force (USAF) KC-135 aircraft's Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM).  Within 
the 564 AMXS, the KC-135 Flight Controls Repair Cell (referred to as the 
Horizontal/Vertical (HV) Repair Cell throughout this paper) is responsible for 
refurbishment of the aircraft's vertical and two horizontal stabilizers. 
As stated by Air Mobility Command's Public Affairs Office, the Boeing KC-135 
Stratotanker's principal mission is air refueling of Department of Defense (DoD) and 
allied nations' aircraft.  In addition to the aircraft's principal mission, KC-135 units 
conduct nonrefueling missions such as:  transporting military troops, cargo, supplies; 
supporting aero medical evacuations; and "providing Beyond Line of Sight data link 
capability" (827th Aircraft Sustainment Group, 2007).  For example, in July 2007, the 
100th Air Refueling Wing at RAF Mildenhall, England, "transported a total of 86 
passengers to and from Kosovo and Romania, while also delivering more than 5,000 
pounds of cargo and a couple of gallons of blood" (Ziezulewicz, 2007, p.1).  Over the last 
six years, the number of these types of missions has risen dramatically in support of 
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and 
Horn of Africa operations. 
As a result of increased operations tempo, both refueling and nontraditional 
taskings continue to stress the aging KC-135 fleet.  According to a recent US 
Government Accountability Office Report, "the KC-135 fleet averages more than          
46 years and is the oldest combat weapon system in the Air Force inventory" (Solis, 
Borseth, Coleman, Mardis, & Thornton, 2007, p. 1).  Furthermore, as indicated by 
Laredo, Pyles, and Snyder's RAND Corporation research (2007) regarding PDM capacity 
and workload growth, issues arise when aircraft are kept beyond the age the USAF has 
experience in maintaining. 
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Recently, USAF maintenance organizations like the 564 AMXS are gaining more 
familiarity with operating aircraft more than 45 years old out of necessity because 
"…current plans call for operating portions of the KC-135 fleet until about age 80" 
(Laredo, Pyles, & Snyder, 2007, p. 84).  With an 80-year lifespan expectancy, 
maintaining aging aircraft by the most cost-effective and efficient means continues to be 
a difficult challenge. 
The USAF must deftly balance funding limitations, priorities, and Congressional 
guidance.  For instance, in an Air Force Magazine article by Scully (2007), the USAF 
plans to retire all 85 KC-135E aircraft in the inventory during 2007 because they 
currently average 49.4 years old.  Moreover, according to the AFM defense reporter, if 
the 85 KC-135E's are not grounded by the end of Fiscal Year 2010, the aircraft's 
Expanded Interim (strut) Repairs will expire and cost the USAF: 
... an additional $17.3 million per aircraft—totaling a pricey $1.4 billion 
for the entire fleet.  And at the end of the day, those KC-135s would then 
average 53 years old.  Last year, Congress allowed the Air Force to retire 
29 of the KC-135Es and 51 C-130Es, but required the service to maintain 
all of the airframes at a state that would allow them to be called back to 
service.  (Scully, 2007, p. 53) 
In line with these rigorous operating and maintenance expectations, the             
564 AMXS mission is to provide customers with top-quality aircraft on-time and at the 
best value (76th Aircraft Maintenance Group, 2007).  Organizational units, including the 
HV Repair Cell, are aligned to work together towards KC-135 PDM schedule execution, 
customer requirements, and continual infrastructure improvement that enhance 
production support. 
The HV Repair Cell faces multiple complexities resulting from evolving mission 
requirements, financial pressures, workforce reductions, the aforementioned aging      
KC-135 fleet, and continuous demands to identify and eradicate waste.  Although the 
unit's current organizational design is structured to support mission accomplishment, 
alternative design changes may enhance performance and/or timeliness.  HV Repair Cell 
design changes may support the overall 564 AMXS' transformational efforts. 
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According to the official USAF website, "transformation is a process by which 
the military achieves and maintains an advantage through changes in operational 
concepts, organization, and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting 
capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment" 
(HAF/XPXC, Air Force Transformation Office, 2007).  Transformation efforts provide 
value and remove non-value-added activities in order to enhance the USAF's abilities to 
accomplish the mission.  As a result, organizations like the HV Repair Cell are better able 
to respond to ever-changing demands, free-up resources for future modernization, and 
eliminate waste in organizational processes. 
The OC-ALC supports USAF transformation through its Transformation Office.  
The Tanker Lean Office Agent, Kenneth Dunn, provides specific details from the May 
2006 Business Unit Plan Development Team established with the 564 AMXS, Battelle, 
Association of Federal Government Employees and union membership.  This partnership 
benefits from the 564 AMXS' experience in maintaining C/KC-135 aircraft and Battelle's 
private industry expertise to transform operations (K. Dunn, personal communication, 
June 1, 2007).  Currently in its final stages, Dunn explains the details of the team's 
overarching transformation plan for future tanker-maintenance performance expectations, 
including: 
• Workload Throughput:  minimum of 48 aircraft per year  
• Maintenance Flow-days:  100 calendar days  
• Work-in-progress:  maximum of 17 aircraft  
• Supply Response:  serviceable parts received for installation in less than 
48 hours after ordered from supply 
OC-ALC senior leaders and KC-135 PDM management expressed interest in 
additional approaches to improve KC-135 PDM operations and invited the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) to conduct this research.  Since the 564 AMXS maintains the 
USAF's oldest combat weapon system—and will do so for nearly four more decades—
the unit is receptive to research that identifies possible organizational and process-
improvement recommendations to support the KC-135's continued operation.  An 
analysis of the organization is used to assess the HV Repair Cell's employment of 
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information channels; leverage of communication avenues across repair cell functions 
and information-sharing; and transfer of task, skill-level, and process information 
between personnel. 
This paper presents the results of using computational organizational modeling 
and simulation as an alternative methodology to support the 564 AMXS transformation 
initiatives by examining the aircraft's flight controls repair process.  The researchers use 
POWer 3.0a software developed by the Virtual Design Team at Stanford University.  The 
model is discussed in greater detail within the Scope section and Literature Review 
chapters. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to provide the KC-135 HV Repair Cell with 
feasible alternatives for decision-makers regarding organizational design to decrease 
flight controls repair throughput time, cost, and risk.  To meet this objective, this project 
develops a computational organizational model of the flight controls repair operation that 
emulates the current maintenance process.  The model helps identify:  potential problems; 
hotspot areas increasing project duration, risk, or cost; positions with work backlog 
affecting decision bottlenecks; and alternative avenues to improve KC-135 flight controls 
repair throughput time.  The model is then modified to characterize the benefits and 
implications of organizational design interventions on improving the flight controls repair 
process and throughput time. 
C. SCOPE 
This Master's of Business Administration (MBA) joint applied project only 
considers the portion of the KC-135 PDM organization and processes that accomplish 
flight controls maintenance.  The report and modeling effort take into account 
maintenance and administration tasks beginning when the HV Repair Cell receives the 
vertical and two horizontal stabilizers (after removal from the aircraft) and ending when 
the repair cell deems the stabilizers serviceable and ready for reinstallation on the       
KC-135.  Additionally, the model only includes personnel assigned to the flight controls 
repair cell and only represents the repair of one set of horizontal and vertical stabilizers.  
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While the repair cell typically processes up to six sets of stabilizers at once, the 
information collected from unit personnel involves one individual set. 
Modeling and simulation of the flight controls repair operation is undertaken 
using unique POWer 3.0a software developed by the Stanford University Virtual Design 
Team led by Dr. Raymond E. Levitt and Dr. John C. Kunz.  POWer is used because it 
quantitatively models work processes, information and communication exchanges, and 
organizational behavior.  The software integrates direct work tasks, coordination, and 
rework into an amount of information for processing by organizational members. 
According to Levitt (2007), workers process information during the simulation 
based on the modeler's settings in POWer addressing.  The modeler assesses how 
coworkers communicate, how decision-making responsibility is handled, skill-level 
relative to associated tasks, team experience, and organizational culture.  After running 
the model, outputs reveal hidden work, project risk, functional risk failure points, and 
position backlog.  The software's capabilities and limitations drive the results of the 
research to model design changes within the KC-135 Flight Controls Repair Cell.  No 
attempt was made to modify or alter the POWer 3.0a software. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The authors' methodology is divided into four major phases: 
1. An extensive literature review is conducted to understand and become 
familiar with:  organizational design theory and information flow research; computational 
organizational modeling theory; the Virtual Design Team's research and methods, and 
previous NPS researcher's organizational modeling techniques.  The literature review 
establishes the necessary foundation to develop the KC-135 Flight Controls Repair Cell 
organizational model. 
2. After becoming familiar with the POWer 3.0a software, the researchers 
performed a site visit to the KC-135 aircraft's PDM Flight Controls Repair Cell,           
564 AMXS, OC-ALC at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  Interviews with unit  
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personnel contributed to data collection and increased the researchers' understanding of 
the HV Repair Cell's process and organizational design.  A description of the modeled 
organization is provided in Chapter III. 
3. Using information collected during the site visit, telephonic and electronic 
mail exchanges, the authors developed a baseline model.  The eProjectManagement's 
SimVision Users' Guide (2003) and the Collaboratory for Research on Global Projects' 
POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0 (2006) references explain how to construct a 
baseline model and describe model characteristics and parameters used in the baseline 
model.  (Note:  specific POWer 3.0a software documentation is not available from 
Stanford University for this research). 
4. Based on their discussions with HV Repair Cell personnel and the insights 
they gained into current organizational operations and resource constraints, the 
researchers identified possible organizational design "interventions."  The baseline model 
is used to assess the strengths and weaknesses of potential changes with regard to eight 
output parameters:  project duration, direct work time, indirect or hidden time (measured 
by rework time, coordination time, exception-handling wait time), total direct and 
indirect work time, total project cost, total functional and project exception time 
(measured by functional exception work and project exception work), project risk, and 
position backlog.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This paper is organized into five chapters.  The first chapter introduces the project 
by describing the background, research objective, scope, and methodology.  The second 
chapter is the literature review.  It supplies general background information about 
computational organizational modeling and specific organizational modeling techniques 
employed within POWer software developed by Stanford University's Virtual Design 
Team.  The third chapter discusses methodology.  The fourth chapter describes the 
results.  Finally, the fifth chapter reveals the conclusions and recommendations provided 
for the HV Repair Cell. 
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Data is collected, analyzed, and entered into the POWer organizational modeling 
and simulation software to establish a baseline model.  The simulation's results help 
identify weaknesses regarding anticipated project duration, amount of position backlog, 
cost, and risk.  These results highlight potential areas of improvement to assist decision-
makers with developing organizational design modifications that will improve the      
KC-135 flight controls repair process and throughput time.  Possible design changes are 
identified as interventions.  Then, the baseline is modified to assess projected 
organizational impacts. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines Jay R. Galbraith's organizational design and 
information-processing research; background on computational organizational modeling; 
and the Virtual Design Team's (VDT) development, methodology and validation of 
computational organizational modeling software.  Additionally, the literature review 
includes previous research using computational organizational modeling and simulation 
by Hagan and Slack (2006) in the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division (AIMD) at 
Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore, California, and by Dillard and Nissen (2007) "to 
assess the behavior and project performance of different organizational designs in 
varying environments" (p. 5). 
A. THEORETICAL BASIS 
Galbraith's (1977) organizational design and information-processing research is 
based heavily on three schools of thought:  the classical school of management developed 
in the 1960s; the human relations school stemming from Harvard University's Hawthorne 
studies conducted by Roethlisberger and Dickson in the 1930s; and the "people 
approach" evolving to some extent from human-relations theory and 1960s research by 
Berlew, Hall, and Schein, coupled with a 1974 study by Edstrom and Galbraith. 
The classical theory focuses on the mechanical structures of organizational 
design, such as division of labor, lines of authority, and centralized versus decentralized 
decision-making (Galbraith, 1977, pp. 13-15, 18).  In comparison, Galbraith states the 
human-relations theory focuses on designing an "informal or humanistic organization" 
(pp. 23-24) through employing supportive behavior, fostering cohesive teams, and 
involving employees in conjunction with mechanistic structures.  Finally, the people 
approach to designing organizations expands human-relations theory by concentrating 
more on the personnel (i.e., the employees) responsible for improving the organization's 
performance and how best to hire, promote, assign, train, and develop them (Galbraith, 
1977). 
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Galbraith (1977) states that the Hawthorne studies originated the theory that 
performance levels vary depending on relations between and among group members, 
subordinates, and supervisors.  Additionally, he incorporates previous research conducted 
by Bernard, Simon, and March in 1958 and 1963, which developed the theory that 
organizational decision-making and information-processing reflect "people's limited 
ability to process information" (Galbraith, 1977, p. 24).  Personnel can only deal with a 
certain quantity of facts and figures before reaching overload or releasing one of the 
pieces of information to make room for a new piece. 
Galbraith's research (1977) identifies five design variables underlying 
organizational design:  task, structure, information and decision process, reward systems, 
and people.  These five variables are interdependent because "a change in one can cause a 
change in the others for the better or for the worse" (Galbraith, 1977, p. 27) within the 
organization. 
For example, Galbraith (1977) suggests that before designing an organization, 
managers should consider how many subordinate roles supervisors can coordinate 
effectively.  One view maintains that human cognitive limitations support a maximum 
number of subordinates that supervisors can manage.  Therefore, the number of 
employees one supervisor coordinates should be limited.  An alternative view suggests 
that "the smaller the span, the greater the number of nonproductive roles that must be 
offset by the greater efficiency generated by the division of labor" (Galbraith, 1977, p. 
17).  When a manager considers both views, he or she can affect organizational decisions 
regarding task set-up, job delegation, information sharing, employee training, and 
performance appraisals.  Moreover, ensuing design-variable decisions influence the 
organization's performance and effectiveness. 
Additionally, Galbraith (1977) discusses decision-making, communication, and 
accountability within organizations.  Staff specialists are normally responsible for "how" 
to conduct operations, while line managers are typically responsible for the more detailed 
"what and when" decisions to conduct operations.  The "what and when" decisions 
surrounding operations are more esoteric than the "how" decisions.  For instance, line 
managers may have to resolve conflicts regarding line and staff misunderstandings or 
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misinterpretations over staff directives.  In contrast, Galbraith's research reveals how 
customary practices often change as a result of design variables and differences in 
information flow patterns.  Specifically, "studies found that task variability, diversity, or 
difficulty were systematically related to structure, leadership style, personality, and 
decision processes" (Galbraith, 1977, p. 31). 
By changing decision-making paths, modifying employee responsibilities, or 
organizing tasks differently, managers can affect individual understanding and 
performance, thus impacting the overall organization's operations.  Galbraith (1977) 
concludes that organizations must strategically manage and periodically adjust the five 
interrelated design factors to function effectively.  He ascertains that the ideal design 
methods to improve information-processing capacity "were to invest in the formal, 
hierarchical information process and to introduce lateral decision processes" (Galbraith, 
1977, p. 56).  Lastly, when faced with environmental and technological uncertainty, 
organizations must consider the tradeoffs of obtaining and sharing information to achieve 
certain levels of information-processing capability. 
B. RATIONALE BEHIND COMPUTATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL 
MODELING 
According to Thomsen, Levitt, Kuntz, Nass, and Fridsma (2003), organizational 
theory encompasses the study of aggregate behaviors between large and small 
organizations and the individuals interacting within those organizations.  Computational 
organizational theory uses computer tools to better understand the relationship of 
organizational micro- and macro- theories and behavior (Thomsen et al., 2003).  This 
type of analysis is known as computational organizational modeling. 
In the 1980s, Dr. Raymond Levitt formed Stanford University's Virtual Design 
Team (VDT) to investigate how to predict organizational behaviors using computational 
organizational modeling.  The VDT team based its computational organizational 
framework on Galbraith's (1974; 1977) information-processing concepts.  Their research 
uses computational organizational modeling to examine work processes and information 
flows associated with project- or task-based organizations (Nissen & Levitt, 2002). 
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According to Kuntz, Christiansen, Cohen, Jin, and Levitt (1998), Galbraith (1977) 
asserts that organizations possess limited abilities to process exceptions (which are 
requests for advice or direction when local knowledge or authority is insufficient to deal 
with the information processing requirements) while accomplishing organizational tasks.  
The VDT incorporates Galbraith's (1977) view regarding exceptions-processing into the 
computational model.  Through functional and project exception probabilities, the VDT's 
computational model simulates task and project failures and subsequent rework when 
organizational knowledge or authority is inadequate.  The unique benefit of POWer 
software is that organization decision-makers can view simulated design changes and 
projected risk or rework levels before they actually implement design changes in their 
organizations. 
1.  Premise of the Model 
The intent of the VDT model is to provide a tool for managers to design 
organizations "the same way engineers design bridges:  by building and analyzing 
computational models of planned organizations and the processes that they support" 
(Kuntz et al., 1998, p. 84).  In this way, the VDT extends organizational theory, whereby 
individual organizational entities—such as actors, activities, and both direct and 
coordination work—are considered in the model's predictions (1998). 
The VDT constructs a computational model that emulates real-world situations 
within the organization (Nissen & Levitt, 2002) and provides a capability to test through 
simulation and evaluate structural and task modifications.  Thus, managers can identify 
the effects the changes have on interdependent activities to later avert cost overruns and 
quality failures (Levitt, 2004).  Additionally, managers can identify unanticipated 
volumes of coordination and rework occurring from overlapping highly interdependent 
tasks.  According to Levitt and Kuntz (2002), "this coordination and rework is hidden 
effort:  it is not planned, tracked, managed or even acknowledged except by the 
overworked staff" (p. 4). 
In Kuntz et al.'s (1998) view, the premise of the VDT model stems from the view 
that organizations are fundamentally information-processing structures supported by 
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information-processing and communication tools.  Consequently, "an organization is an 
information-processing and communication system, structured to achieve a specific set of 
tasks, and composed of limited teams (actors) that process information" (Kuntz et al., 
1998, p. 85).  The VDT's model simulates each activity being performed by responsible 
actors and computes overall project duration, cost, and coordination quality (1998).  
Additionally, their simulation helps bridge the gap between organizational theory and 
experience at the micro- and macro-levels. 
2.  Description of Model Operation 
This section describes an overview of the VDT's model operation and summarizes 
Kuntz et al.'s 1998 article.  The VDT extends Galbraith's (1977) notion of communication 
channels by modeling relationships among actors.  Actors are each supported by 
communication tools.  Functional attributes of actors affect the timing and quality of 
information transfer across communication channels.  Actors are modeled in terms of 
capability, actions, and organizational roles. 
Inputs to the VDT model transform qualitative attribute values into quantitative 
values.  These inputs are based on activities that consume time and may (or may not) 
generate communications and exceptions.  Exceptions occur in the model when a worker 
detects a task requiring additional information or a decision or when the model generates 
an error that may need correcting by the worker.  The VDT model assigns all actors a 
processing speed and a verification failure probability.  During the verification process, 
failure probability determines when a sub-activity within an overall activity will fail. 
Additionally, the VDT model incorporates activity coordination requirements 
among actors.  Coordination requirements are measured in terms of verification failure 
probability that results from complex activities (i.e., uncertain and interdependent) and 
communication intensity.  Coordination requires transfer of information between and 
among actors.  Actors can communicate information received and processed by other 
actors.  The VDT model labels communications as "work communications" or 
"coordination communications." 
 14
According to Kuntz et al. (1998), when the simulation completes a sub-activity, it 
stochastically determines whether or not it failed based on the verification failure 
probability input.  If the sub-activity fails, a failure exception is generated.  A failure 
exception initiates an "exception-decision" process.  The VDT simulation requires 
managers to decide whether to rework or ignore the exception, which translates to the 
actor via a "decision communication."  This decision may add more time and complexity 
to an actor's task. 
At the end of the simulation, the model produces actions and interactions among 
actors and shows the organization's behavior and performance.  Kuntz et al. (1998) 
proclaim the actor's information-processing and exception-handling form the core of the 
VDT micro-theory framework and establish the model's usefulness.  The VDT 
framework is supported by Galbraith's (1973, 1974) theory that organizations serve as 
"exception-handling machines" as part of his information-processing view of 
organizations.  Based on their conceptualization of Galbraith's theory, the VDT's 
"approach simulates the direct work and the hidden work, i.e., the coordination, 
supervision, rework and waiting for all the actors in a project as they perform all of the 
project tasks" (Levitt & Kunz, 2002, p. 11). 
3.  VDT's Methodology 
As outlined by Levitt and Kunz (2002), there are four steps in the VDT's 
methodology:  (a) define baseline work process and organization, (b) simulate project to 
assess risks for baseline case, (c) flight-simulate alternative management interventions, 
and (d) refine and archive model to capture lessons learned. 
Documenting baseline assumptions helps capture the total effort required to 
complete an organization's project.  Baseline assumptions include identifying:  critical 
milestones, workflow and decision-making policies, information required to be processed 
by position personnel, and allowance for rework that spreads between parallel tasks as 
changes or errors occur (Levitt & Kunz, 2002). 
In the second step, modelers simulate the data collected to establish a baseline 
model best representing the current organization.  The baseline's results help identify 
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organizational risks and potential interventions to apply to the model that may mitigate 
those risks.  Step Three simulates separate or combined alternative interventions to 
evaluate output for potential organizational performance improvements.  Finally, Step 
Four establishes the model's calibration and validity as a reusable template to analyze 
current circumstances and predicted design modifications.  According to an additional 
VDT study by Thomsen et al. (2003), the model's validity characteristic suggests that two 
different modelers given the same organization will be able to reproduce the same results. 
4. Validation of VDT Model 
The VDT demonstrated the model's validity by applying an emulation-based 
simulation model called Virtual Team Alliance (VTA) to the Lockheed Launch Vehicle 
Project (LLVP).  Using a natural history experimental approach, team members applied 
the model to the ongoing project and performed a series of experiments to produce 
forward predictions about the LLVP's remaining tasks.  The natural history method is 
more robust than retrospective experiments that duplicate past performance because the 
researcher cannot "curve fit" calibration parameters to unknown future performance 
benchmarks (Thomsen et al., 2003). 
During the LLVP test, the VTA predicted backlog risks, quality problems, and 
potential delays in teams (outside of Lockheed) developing outsourced components, 
including the flight-box (Nissen & Levitt, 2002; Thomsen et al., 2003).  Although these 
predictions were provided to LLVP managers, their inexperience with the VTA's 
modeling methodology prevented them from taking any intervening actions (Nissen & 
Levitt, 2002). 
According to Nissen and Levitt (2002) and Thomsen et al. (2003), when the 
backlog and its impacts later materialized exactly as predicted, they severely impacted 
the LLVP's cost and schedule.  Additionally, "during the demonstration launch, the 
launch vehicle veered off-course, and range control operators detonated the vehicle, 
along with its commercial payload" (Thomsen et al., 2003, p. 15).  Post-launch 
investigation and data analysis revealed the mishap was caused by cable and flight-box 
problems under the subcontractor's responsibility.  The VTA correctly predicted this area 
 16
was at higher risk for product quality.  This study provided evidence of the VTA's 
validity and predictive power, which could be used to change future results based on 
predicted simulation outcomes. 
C. ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL MODELING RESEARCH 
Research conducted by Hagan and Slack (2006) and Dillard and Nissen (2007) 
recommends using computational organizational modeling to assist managers in 
identifying methods of improving information flow to enhance organizational 
performance.   
Additionally, Hagan, Slack, Dillard, and Zolin (2007) provide further insight into 
the implications of computational organizational modeling.  Computational 
organizational modeling enables leaders and managers to model and simulate planned 
organizational changes, evaluate prospective changes, calculate the impact, and 
determine if potential benefits are worth the costs and risks.  NAS Lemoore's AIMD 
leaders' implementation of Hagan and Slack's recommendations and subsequent 
improvement to the F414 engine repair further demonstrated the VDT software's 
usefulness.  Additionally, Hagan and Slack's research (2006) supports the U.S. Navy's 
transformation efforts. 
Their project inspired this current research to explore a specific USAF 
organization utilizing Stanford University's 3.0a POWer software, the most current 
edition of the VDT tool.  In addition, the authors examined Dillard and Nissen's (2007) 
findings on the utility of computational modeling research.  Dillard and Nissen reveal that 
while computational experimentation incorporates computer models rather than real 
people (making it weaker than laboratory experimentation and field methods), it offers 
distinct benefits to decision-makers. 
Primarily, computational modeling allows decision-makers to identify and 
examine unintended consequences of organizational design changes before actually 
implementing the design changes.  Furthermore, computational organizational modeling 
provides decision-makers quantitative evidence for enacting prospective design changes 
within the organization. 
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The USAF's transformation efforts began at the Air Force Materiel Command's 
Air Logistics Centers (ALC) (Moseley & Wynne, 2005).  The researchers' review of 
current USAF transformation initiatives did not reveal previous experimentation with 
computational organizational modeling.  Working in concert with other transformation 
initiatives (i.e., Lean Operations and Six Sigma process improvements), the researchers 
believe the ALCs are mature "targets of opportunity" to apply computational 
organizational modeling. 
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This chapter is divided into five sections:  an overview of the HV Repair Cell, an 
outline of the model's characteristics, a description of the model's development, the 
establishment of the baseline model, and the presentation of seven modeling 
interventions. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF MODELED ORGANIZATION 
This section provides an overview of the KC-135 aircraft's Programmed Depot 
Maintenance (PDM) Flight Controls Repair Cell (also referred to as the HV Repair Cell), 
its responsibilities, and task breakdowns.  The researchers conducted multiple telephone 
and e-mail exchanges with HV Repair Cell personnel to collect information about the 
flight controls repair operation in order to build and populate the baseline organizational 
model.  Additionally, the researchers made a site visit to the KC-135 aircraft's PDM 
Flight Controls Repair Cell, 564th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (564 AMXS), 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) to increase their understanding of the 
repair and maintenance process and organizational design. 
The computational organizational model of the HV Repair Cell includes four 
repair cell operations.  As depicted by Figure 1, the four operations supporting the HV 
repair process are:  production, planning, scheduling, and logistics. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Visual Representation of the HV Repair Cell's Four Sections 
 
1. Production 
Production personnel consist of a team leader, nine aircraft mechanics, and         
14 sheet metal mechanics.  These personnel perform direct repair and maintenance on the 
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horizontal and vertical stabilizers.  After the aircraft's acceptance into the HV Repair 
Cell, aircraft mechanics remove the elevators, rudder, close-out and balance-bay panels, 
hinges, linkages, vertical cap fairing, and power control unit (PCU).  Following 
disassembly, production personnel coordinate with the logistics section for necessary 
repair items and parts.  Then, production personnel work with scheduling to route the 
horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, balance panels, elevators, and rudder for 
washing and chemical stripping. 
The other removed parts and modules are routed as required.  For instance, 
production personnel place hinges, linkages, and close-out panels on a pallet for storage.  
The PCU is stored or turned-in as required.  Also, personnel route the vertical cap fairing 
to a supporting back-shop for fiberglass repair. 
Following washing and chemical stripping by a supporting back-shop, production 
personnel perform inspections, coordinate with planning for discrepancy routing, follow-
up with logistics for parts and equipment, and begin repairs for lugs, horizontal 
stabilizers, and the vertical stabilizer. 
2. Planning 
The planner is responsible for forecasting material to support scheduled HV 
repairs.  The planner uses a 1-year forecast to examine history and determine what 
percentage of material to order.  Additionally, the planner reviews routes, and approves 
all Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Form 202, Nonconforming Technical 
Assistance Request and Reply forms—used to identify discrepancies outside of technical 
order repair limits.  The planner coordinates with production and may seek assistance 
from quality control personnel to plan labor requirements and prepare required work 
control documents (WCDs).  Also, the planner coordinates with the logistics section and 




The Aircraft Logistics Specialist (ALS) is responsible for scheduling, general 
administration tasks (e.g., preparing the asset's strip package and assembling the aircraft 
book), updating the Program Depot Maintenance Schedule System (PDMSS), and for 
updating the Aircraft Parts Tracking System (APTS) according to nomenclature, trailer 
numbers, storage date, and present location (e.g., an entry of TR135-HV14-SH-3705 in 
APTS identifies the HV14 assets are located in trailer 135 within building 3705). 
4. Logistics 
The Forward Logistics Specialist (FLS) is responsible for logistics requirements, 
such as ordering and tracking material, parts, and equipment.  The FLS works with 
production to control item turn-in and order necessary repair parts if bench stock items 
are not needed.  Otherwise, bench stock items are obtained from supply.  The FLS uses 
the electronic DO43 Master Item Identification Control System to check item 
Expendability, Recoverability, and Repairability Codes (ERRC) and verify if a repairable 
part must be turned in for depot-level repair before the FLS ordering a new one.  Prior to 
ordering parts, the FLS researches stock numbers and operation numbers to ensure 
accuracy.  Additionally, if an Industrial Prime Vendor (IPV) item is required by 
production to accomplish HV repairs, the FLS coordinates with the supporting contractor 
for the IPV part. 
C. MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 
This section describes the POWer 3.0a software parameters used to build the   
KC-135 aircraft's PDM Flight Controls Repair Cell model.  The parameters are explained 
using eProject Management's SimVision Users' Guide (2003) and the Collaboratory for 
Research on Global Projects' POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0 (2006) references. 
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1. Major Milestones 
Milestones identify the objective of the type of work being performed.  Within the 
HV Repair Cell model, a milestone indicates the beginning or end of all work (see 
Chapter III, Section C.2.) required to complete the milestone's objective. 
2. Tasks 
After defining the major milestones, the authors define the tasks to accomplish 
each milestone.  Tasks represent all jobs HV Repair Cell employees are responsible for 
completing.  Flight controls maintenance and administrative tasks are described at an 
effective level-of-detail to keep the model manageable without becoming overly 
complicated or detailed.  Without proper detail, the model does not allow accurate 
identification of possible alternatives or potential courses of action for enhancing the 
flight controls PDM process and throughput time.  Information within each major task 
includes: 
a. Estimated nominal duration (effort) required to complete each task. 
b. Estimated skill types and skill-levels (required skill) necessary to 
accomplish each task. 
c. Estimated task priority and sequencing to identify whether or not tasks are 
done with a precedence decision, in parallel, or sequentially. 
d.  Estimated requirement complexity to depict how difficult it is for 
employees to understand task requirements and to represent the number of sub-tasks 
required to accomplish the overall task. 
e.  Estimated task uncertainty to represent the volume of communication and 
information-sharing between employees required to perform assigned tasks. 
3. Positions 
Along with milestones and tasks, positions within the organization that directly 
impact and complete KC-135 flight controls repair tasks are modeled.  Positions include 
personnel responsible for flight controls repair, administrative paperwork, and 
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supervising subordinate's efforts and tasks.  Additionally, leadership positions modeled 
depict decision-making personnel who regularly receive questions from subordinates 
about flight controls maintenance and administrative tasks.  Information for each position 
includes: 
a. Number of full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel assigned to each position. 
b. Specific tasks the position is responsible for completing. 
c. Estimated skill-level types (skill rating) the position possesses to 
accomplish each task. 
d. Estimated role that each position fills to accomplish respective flight 
controls repair task(s).  The POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0 (2006) defines the 
three roles a position can occupy as Subteam (st), Subteam Lead (sl), and Project 
Manager (pm). 
4. Meetings 
In the model, meetings represent important methods whereby personnel in certain 
positions regularly and reliably transfer information about tasks and repair processes.  
The organizational model illustrates the types, numbers, and lengths of formal meetings 
directly affecting the HV repair process.  Although personnel attend additional meetings 
outside of flight controls maintenance, these meetings are not be modeled because it is 
assumed no information concerning flight controls repair and administration is 
transferred.  This assumption takes a conservative approach.  KC-135 aircraft's Flight 
Controls Repair Cell personnel describe the following meeting characteristics: 
a. Regularly scheduled meetings (meeting interval, meeting time, and 
duration) supporting flight controls repair. 
b. Required and optional attendees for regularly scheduled meetings. 
c. Other informal meetings/communications supporting flight controls repair. 
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5. Information Transfer and Decision-making 
This section describes decision-making policies and procedures regarding the 
flight controls repair operation.  Parameters stemming from policies impact micro-
decision-making behavior of workers and supervisory personnel.  For instance, if a 
responsible decision-maker becomes backlogged during the HV repair process, this may 
affect positions relying on decision support to complete repair or administrative tasks. 
Parameter settings within the HV Repair Model are interrelated and work with 
other model settings.  For example, meetings, rework links, communication links, and 
exception probability settings interact with centralization and formalization settings.  The 
model simulates these interactions by predicting project duration, risk, direct and indirect 
work, functional and project exceptions, cost impacts, position backlog, and functional 
risk based on the following model parameters: 
a. Team Experience.  This parameter defines the extent to which 
organizational members previously and successfully worked together to accomplish the 
project.  The set value determines how quickly or slowly positions process information.  
Within POWer, team experience can be set at high, medium, or low. 
b. Centralization.  The centralization parameter defines whether decisions 
are made by senior-level positions or decentralized to lower-level (subordinate), 
responsible positions.  The set value establishes how high- or low-level decision-making 
occurs, which in turn, impacts project duration, position backlog, and project risk.  The 
settings available in POWer for centralization include high, medium, and low. 
c. Formalization.  This parameter defines whether communication within the 
organization tends to occur formally in meetings, informally between position members, 
or evenly between formal and informal methods.  The set value works closely with the 
communication probability (described below in Chapter III, Section 5.e., Communication 
Probability) setting by affecting the amount and frequency of coordination across the 
organization between positions and relating to task completion.  This parameter's POWer 
values consist of high, medium, and low. 
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d. Matrix Strength.  Matrix strength defines the "connectedness" of the 
organization.  This setting illustrates the use of informal and formal information 
exchanges, perceived need to attend meetings, and percentage of formal meetings 
attended.  The set value affects how positions exchange information, in what setting they 
exchange information, and the frequency of personnel meeting attendance.  Within 
POWer, the matrix strength can be set at high, medium, or low.  Additionally, according 
to the SimVision Users' Guide (eProjectManagement, 2003): 
(1) A high strength value indicates workers focus more on information 
exchange and have a lower perceived need to attend meetings.  At this setting, the 
POWer simulation calculator makes workers attend 60% of their meetings and take care 
of 90% of their informal communications. 
(2) A medium strength setting means workers make almost even 
amounts of formal and informal communications.  POWer calculates this value so 
workers attend to 70% of both their informal and formal communications. 
(3) A low strength value causes workers to attend more meetings and 
tend to ignore information exchanges.  POWer uses this setting to make workers attend 
90% of their meetings and take care of 60% of their informal communications. 
e. Communication Probability.  Within POWer, this parameter measures the 
level of communication required between tasks that are interdependent.  For instance, if 
position personnel accomplishing a task must communicate information about work-in-
progress to a position responsible for another task, then the two tasks are dependent on 
information-sharing.  The typical value is set in the range of 0.2 to 0.9 
(eProjectManagement, 2003).  A low value defines jobs involving higher amounts of 
routine or standardized tasks performed by workers that are more skilled.  A high value 
defines jobs involving other highly-interdependent tasks performed by less skilled or very 
busy workers. 
f. Noise Probability.  The noise probability parameter measures the 
probability of interruptions in an ordinary working day that take time away from position 
members conducting direct flight controls repair tasks.  Higher levels of noise within 
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organizations result in rework and schedule slippages, which then impact position 
backlog, project risk, cost, and duration.  The SimVision Users' Guide 
(eProjectManagement, 2003) references the general POWer noise probability setting in 
the range of 0.01 (low) to 0.10 (significant, but common).  According to the guide, a 
value of 0.20 or greater generates more rework and increases the organization's likelihood 
of finishing the project late. 
6. Rework Links 
Rework links represent where rework occurs resulting from and related to 
identified tasks.  Any rework links added to the model indicate significant exceptions 
(i.e., unexpected changes or errors) and include a measure of rework duration for the 
identified dependent tasks.  Rework duration is defined as rework strength in the model 
and is discussed in the Model Development section. 
There are two model parameters that factor into the simulation (i.e., they take 
effect) when rework links are added:  Functional Exception Probability and Project 
Exception Probability. 
a. Functional Exception Probability.  This parameter defines the probability 
repair tasks fail due to localized task errors and require rework by the position 
responsible for the errors.  The SimVision Users' Guide (eProjectManagment, 2003) 
explains this parameter is usually set in the range of 0.05 (low) to 0.10 (significant, but 
common).  Higher values for functional exceptions involve unproven technology or 
innovative work processes.  Conversely, lower values involve relatively well-understood 
technology and standardized work processes. 
Errors may be detected through self-check procedures, after completion of related 
work by position peers, or by a supervisor's review.  Position personnel often go up the 
supervisory chain for assistance for error correction remedies and assistance.  When the 
model generates a functional exception, the Users' Guide states the position responsible 
for correcting the error conducts one of three actions—Rework, Quickfix, or Ignore.   
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If the supervisor contacted is backlogged and dealing with other issues, workers 
may ignore or fix errors improperly (quick-fix) to avoid waiting.  Ignoring or 
inadequately fixing errors causes project risk to escalate. 
b. Project Exception Probabilities.  In POWer, this parameter defines the 
probability a repair task fails and generates rework for all dependent tasks.  If applicable 
to the organization, these tasks are connected by rework links in the model.  The more 
rework links incorporated into the HV Repair Cell model, the more rework is generated 
by exceptions that occur.  When the model detects a project error, a "project exception" is 
conveyed to the position accountable for the failed task. 
As with functional exceptions, the responsible position reworks, quickly fixes, or 
ignores the error when the model generates a project exception.  Similar to how the 
model handles functional exceptions with backlogged supervisory positions, if project 
exceptions are generated and the supervisor responds slowly, workers may decide to 
ignore or quick-fix and induce higher project risk. 
The SimVision Users' Guide advises setting the parameter in the range of 0.05 
(low) to 0.10 (significant, but common).  A low value indicates a project involves 
relatively standardized tasks and routine processes, while a high value reflects 
nonstandard and innovative work processes.  The guide also states a probability setting of 
0.20 or greater can generate so much rework that the project never finishes. 
7. Communication Links 
Along with rework links, communication links concern tasks requiring technical 
interdependency, tight coordination, or integration.  As stated in Chapter III, Section 
C.5.e, the communication probability parameter measures the level of communication 
required between interdependent tasks.   
As indicated by the POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0 (2006) and SimVision 
Users' Guide (eProjectManagment, 2003), communication links represent task 
completion and integration dependency.  If two tasks require personnel to talk and share 
information, a communication link is incorporated into the model between those two 
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interdependent tasks.  Communication links inform the model that these tasks depend on 
each other for information.  Additionally, "communication links have no effect on the 
simulation without rework links" (POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0, 2006, p.21).  
Thus, wherever a communication link is added, a rework link is also added. 
For each communication link, the task uncertainty parameter is changed within 
each interdependent task to account for the amount of information-dependency and 
communication requirements.  According to the SimVision Users' Guide 
(eProjectManagment, 2003), the task uncertainty level depends on the degree to which 
information needed to complete a flight controls repair task is available at the time the 
task begins.  When critical information required for completion is unavailable when a 
task starts, the uncertainty level is set to high.  Conversely, uncertainty level is set to low 
if most needed information is available at task start time.  Examples of information 
requirements include output from a concurrent task, contingent decisions about task 
procedures, or unknown conditions surrounding market conditions. 
8. Knowledge Links 
Knowledge links represent relationships and information-sharing between 
coworkers.  Coworkers provide information to other employees about task requirements 
by sharing their skills and experiences.  Without knowledge-sharing, workers may make 
decisions concerning task completion that compromise overall task and/or HV repair 
quality.  By sharing information and communicating within the information-hierarchy, 
functional exceptions and project risk are mitigated. 
9. Non-touch Tasks 
In addition to modeling core flight controls maintenance and administrative tasks, 
off-core, non-touch tasks (also known as "dummy tasks") are modeled.  These types of 
tasks reflect the time a position is occupied even when employees assigned to that 
position are not specifically working core tasks.  Non-touch tasks properties and 
parameters are the same as core repair and administrative tasks. 
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10. Time Lags 
Organizations external to the HV Repair Cell conduct repairs on each set of 
horizontal and vertical stabilizers.  Information regarding outside organizational tasks, 
work duration, and sequencing is collected.  Non-HV Repair Cell tasks are modeled 
through the use of time lags and not stand-alone task boxes.  Time delays account for the 
time HV Repair Cell personnel spend waiting on non-HV Repair Cell functions during 
the repair cell process flow. 
D. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The following information is used to populate the KC-135 aircraft's PDM Flight 
Controls Repair Cell model in accordance with the SimVision Users' Guide 
(eProjectManagment, 2003) and the POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0 (2006). 
The HV Repair Cell model incorporates the total work effort, which includes:  
direct work to complete milestones and tasks; repair cell employees accomplishing direct 
work; meetings workers attend to receive information about repair and administrative 
procedures; supervision work to handle employees' questions (i.e., exception handling 
and decision-making); rework between parallel tasks as errors occur; communication 
work by positions to coordinate interdependent tasks and transfer information; and 
knowledge-sharing work to represent in-house working relationships. 
1. General Model Properties 
General model properties are depicted for the overall HV Repair Cell model.  
Overall program elements define the organization's characteristic, operating environment, 
and design structure.  The general parameters are described within Chapter III, Sections 
D.6.a. through D.6.f., D.7.a., and D.7b.  Program elements include project description, 
work day, work week, team experience, centralization, formalization, matrix strength, 
communication probability, noise probability, functional exception probability, and 
project exception probability as illustrated by Figure 2.   
The HV Repair Cell model's general property panel settings are listed in 
Appendix A for the initial baseline model and seven intervention models.  (Note:  Inst. 
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Exception Probability is a new POWer 3.0a software parameter and not defined by the 
SimVision Users' Guide or the POWer Documentation for POWer 2.0.  The researchers 
do not utilize this parameter to construct the HV Repair Cell model). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Sample General Property Panel for Initial HV Repair Cell Model 
 
2. Major Milestones 
The HV Repair Cell refurbishes the aircraft's vertical and two horizontal 
stabilizers.  Figure 3 depicts the four major milestones within the repair process:  
acceptance/disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup. 
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Figure 3.   Horizontal and Vertical Stabilizers Repair Cell Model's Major 
Milestones 
 
a. Acceptance/Disassembly.  The HV repair process begins by inducting the 
vertical and two horizontal stabilizers into the repair processes.  This task is known as 
acceptance.  Acceptance is the responsibility of the repair cell's team leader.  It involves 
individually moving the stabilizers, which are resting on trailers, from the temporary 
storage area into the repair cell facility.  The team leader performs a cursory inspection to 
identify any potential damage that may have occurred during transport after stabilizers 
were removed from the aircraft. 
Following this brief examination, the stabilizers are disassembled.  Disassembly is 
the responsibility of the HV Repair Cell's aircraft mechanics.  After acceptance, the 
stabilizers are individually hoisted by crane from trailers to work stands for disassembly.  
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Disassembly involves removing the rudder, leading edge, panels and linkages, closeout 
panels and balance bay panels from the vertical stabilizer.  The elevators, panels and 
linkages, closeout panels and upper and lower skins are removed from the horizontal 
stabilizers.  The stabilizers are hoisted back onto trailers.  Along with the other rudder, 
elevators, and balance bay panels, the stabilizers are towed from the repair cell to another 
organization to wash or chemically strip prior to inspection and repair.  (Note:  the 
rudder, elevators, and balance bay panels are repaired by a non-HV Repair Cell 
organization and then returned to the HV Repair Cell for reinstallation on the stabilizers). 
b. Inspection.  Inspection of the stabilizers is performed by the HV Repair 
Cell's sheet metal technicians.  Inspection requirements include:  looking for corrosion, 
missing items (e.g., bolts), cracks, wear, security, frozen/loose bearings, damage, general 
condition; delamination of fiberglass assemblies on the vertical stabilizer and of honey 
comb panels on the horizontal stabilizers; and, checking the integrity of rubber hoses that 
carry hydraulic fluid, fasteners, antenna area on the vertical stabilizer, vertical and 
horizontal stabilizer attach points, access panels, lugholes, nut plates, and rubber cables. 
All discrepancies are recorded and determined if repair or replacement is needed.  
Items needing replacement are ordered by the FLS.  Any discrepancies outside of 
technical order repair limits are described and annotated on an AFMC Form 202: 
Nonconforming Technical Assistance Request and Reply.  Then, AFMC Form 202s are 
submitted to an on-site contractor engineer to determine how to repair the discrepancies. 
c. Repair.  This milestone includes repair of horizontal and vertical links, 
horizontal and vertical lugs, and stabilizers.  Both types of links are repaired by aircraft 
mechanics in the same manner.  Lugs and stabilizers are repaired by the sheet metal 
technicians and the team leader.  These repairs follow separate repair processes 
depending on type (e.g., horizontal or vertical).  Additionally, some lug repair tasks are 
performed by non-HV Repair Cell organizations.  Outside organizations are dispatched to 
the flight controls repair facility to perform required lug maintenance. 
Throughout the HV repair process, quality-assurance inspections are conducted to 
monitor and ensure compliance with technical orders and defined task (job) standards.  
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Ongoing quality inspections are not modeled as separate tasks, but instead included with 
modeled repair task duration (effort) times. 
d. Buildup.  The buildup process of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers is 
performed by the cell's aircraft mechanics.  By the time this milestone begins, the rudder, 
elevator, and balance bay panels are delivered and ready for reinstallation on their 
respective stabilizers. 
Buildup requires:  general installation; sealing of surfaces; bearing grease and 
replacement; and installing the links, balance bay panels, rudder, elevator, vertical 
stabilizer power control unit, and closeout panels.  Completion of this milestone is the 
end of the physical repair process, thus signifying the vertical and horizontal stabilizers 
are certified complete and ready for reinstallation on the aircraft.  The POWer model 
ends at this milestone. 
3. Tasks 
During the HV repair process (acceptance/disassembly, inspection, repair, and 
buildup) simultaneous production, scheduling, planning, and logistics operations occur.  
The HV Repair Cell model incorporates multiple tasks and sub-tasks taking place by 
personnel throughout the flight controls repair process. 
Figure 4 illustrates the HV Repair Cell Model's four major milestones and 
horizontal and vertical stabilizers repair tasks.  Appendix C lists the baseline HV Repair 









































































































Figure 4.   Horizontal and Vertical Stabilizers Repair Cell Model's Milestones 
and Tasks 
 
Specifically, within the repair milestone, responsible actors perform numerous 
tasks and sub-tasks as follows: 
a. The horizontal stabilizer lug repair includes eleven sequential tasks.  
Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) technicians from a non-HV Repair Cell organization 
spot-weld skin splice joints, spars, and surfaces.  Sheet metal technicians then remove 
bushings from lug holes.  Next, external wash-rack personnel chemically strip the lug 
areas.  Sheet metal technicians remove grease and buff to remove corrosion before 
inspection of the lugs.  As a certified sheet metal technician, the team lead then inspects 
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the lugs for serviceability.  Based on historical data, AFMC Form 202s are submitted 
100% of the time for engineering disposition. 
Dispatched machinists spot face to remove corrosion on upper and lower lug 
holes.  NDI personnel perform a magnetic particle inspection of lug surfaces and holes 
for cracks.  Sheet metal technicians apply ammonium persulphate to check for the steel's 
condition and verify its strength following heat treating of machined surfaces.  Wash-rack 
personnel return to the facility to shot peen all reworked surfaces with steel shot media.  
Additionally, external cadmium plate technicians brush all cadmium plate steel parts 
using a low hydrogen embrittlement process.  Finally, dispatched machinists install new 
bushings in the lug holes of the stabilizers to complete the horizontal lug repair process. 
b. The vertical stabilizer lug repair includes three sequential tasks.  First, 
sheet metal technicians degrease lug surfaces and remove all primer and surface 
corrosion.  Second, external wash-rack personnel shot peen all reworked surfaces.  
Finally, cadmium plate technicians brush all cadmium plate steel parts using a low 
hydrogen embrittlement process. 
c.  Horizontal and vertical stabilizers are repaired by sheet metal technicians.  
Following inspection, AFMC Form 202s are required 70% of the time for discrepancies 
beyond technical order limits.  Meanwhile, within-technical-order-limit discrepancies are 
corrected by technicians.  Along with developing the detailed task structure                 
(i.e., sequential and parallel task process flow), other information collected is 
incorporated into the computational model (as shown by Figure 5 for the "Receipt of 
Flight Controls" task). 
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Figure 5.   Sample Property Panel for "Receive Flight Controls" Task 
 
Additional task information collected from HV Repair Cell personnel includes: 
a. The nominal duration in minutes, represented by effort (in Figure 5) 
required for each task's completion. 
b. The determination whether or not each task can be accomplished more 
quickly if additional personnel are added. 
c. The skill types and levels required for each task's accomplishment 
(represented by the required skill parameter in Figure 5). 
d. The precedence (priority) of each task respective to other tasks for which 
employees are responsible. 
e. The determination of requirement complexity for each task to capture how 
difficult it is for employees to understand task requirements and to represent the number 
of sub-tasks required to accomplish the overall task. 
f. The determination of uncertainty for each task to capture the volume of 
communication and information-sharing between employees required to perform 
assigned tasks. 
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4. Positions  
Based on knowledge gained from HV Repair Cell interviews and e-mail 
exchanges, the HV Repair Cell model includes eight positions responsible for executing 
all repair and administrative tasks and characterizes the hierarchy of information flow 
among these positions. 
Figure 6 depicts the organizational design of the eight positions and information 
hierarchy.  It shows positions executing flight controls repair, accomplishing 
administrative paperwork, and supervising subordinates' efforts and flight controls repair 
tasks.  The model also includes leadership positions to identify decision-making 
personnel who regularly receive exception-handling questions from subordinates. 
Appendix E identifies the baseline HV Repair Cell model's Position Property 
Panel Settings. 
 
Figure 6.   HV Repair Cell Positions and Information Hierarchy 
 
The eight positions in the baseline model include: 
a. PS:  Production Supervisor, responsible for the overall end-product and 
that HV repairs are performed and completed properly. 
b. TL:  Team Leader (illustrated in Figure 7), responsible for HV acceptance, 
inspections and repairs, and for directing aircraft and sheet metal mechanics. 
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c. PN:  Planner, responsible for forecasting material required for planned HV 
repairs, reviewing and approving AFMC 202s, and for preparing WCDs. 
d. ALS:  Aircraft Logistics Specialist, responsible for scheduling, general 
administration, updating PDMSS, and updating APTS. 
e. FLS:  Forward Logistics Specialist, responsible for ordering and tracking 
material requirements. 
f. AM7:  Seven Aircraft Mechanics that hold high-level repair skills, 
responsible for disassembly and buildup of horizontal and vertical stabilizers. 
g. AM2:  Two Aircraft Mechanics that currently hold low-level repair skills, 
responsible for repairing linkages. 
h. SM:  14 Sheet Metal Mechanics, responsible for inspection and repair of 
lugs, horizontal stabilizers, and vertical stabilizers. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Sample Property Panel for Team Leader Position 
 
For each position, the number of FTEs assigned, number of responsible tasks, 
skill level(s), and roles are developed.  Within the supervisory chain and information-
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flow hierarchy, higher-level positions (designated by a pm or sl role assignment) include 
similar or higher skill levels than the subordinates they supervise and/or handle 
exceptions.  This assigned skill level represents their knowledge, experience, and ability 
to handle exceptions and communicate information to lower-level positions when 
required.   
For example, Figure 7 illustrates the TL's role is set to sl to represent the 
position's location in the information hierarchy over three st positions (AM7, AM2, and 
SM). 
5. Meetings 
Meetings represent how positions regularly and reliably transfer information.  
Only meetings that directly affect flight controls maintenance are modeled.  Information 
describing meeting priority compared to other meetings and responsible tasks, meeting 
duration, intervals between meetings, and the meeting time is entered into the HV Repair 
Cell model.  Figure 8 shows the property panel for the HV Repair Cell's Daily Tail Team 
Meeting.  Additionally, Appendix F lists the baseline HV Repair Cell model's Meeting 
Property Panel Settings. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Sample Property Panel for Daily Tail Team Meeting 
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6. Information Transfer and Decision-making 
Based on data collection and communications with HV Repair Cell personnel, the 
researchers describe the decision-making policies and procedures regarding flight 
controls repair in this section.  These parameters are set on the General Property Repair 
Panel (refer to Appendix A and Chapter III, Section D.1.). 
a. Team Experience.  Chapter III, Section C.5.a. (above) defines team 
experience as the extent to which organizational members previously and successfully 
worked together to accomplish the project.  POWer allows the modeler to select a high, 
medium, or low setting.  Interviews and personal observation substantiate the 
organization has previous experience completing KC-135 flight controls repairs.  
However, based on information provided by HV Repair Cell leaders, six of 29 (20.7%) 
employees are new hires; they entered the organization over the last six months. 
Four sheet metal mechanics experienced at performing other KC-135 PDM 
repairs are now learning the horizontal and vertical stabilizer repair process.  
Additionally, two inexperienced sheet metal apprentices are starting to learn how to 
repair stabilizers.  New personnel impact the organization by requiring all personnel to 
increase the amount and time spent on information-sharing.  Therefore, the team 
experience parameter is initially set to medium. 
b. Centralization.  Chapter III, Section C.5.b. above describes centralization 
as the metric depicting whether organizational decisions are made by senior-level 
positions or are decentralized to lower-level (subordinate) responsible positions.  The 
settings for this parameter are high, medium, or low. 
Collected information describes decision-making responsibilities within the repair 
cell.  Accordingly, the majority of repair and administrative tasks are routine.  Decision-
making responsibility is primarily decentralized at positions with st roles (i.e., the ALS, 
PN, FLS, AM7, AM2, and SM positions).  On the other hand, critical decisions and 
exception-handling involving less standardized tasks are retained by higher-level 
management personnel.  For example, during removal of lug bushings when extensive 
corrosion is encountered, Sheet Metal Mechanics require the team leader's involvement 
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to decide how to continue removing bushings.  Overall, within the flight controls repair 
cell, centralization for the baseline is modeled as medium. 
c. Formalization.  Chapter III, Section C.5.c. explains formalization is the 
parameter to describe whether communication methods tend to occur formally in 
meetings, informally between position members, or evenly between formal and informal 
methods.  In the model, the parameter may have a high, medium, or low setting.  
Collected information confirms most communication occurs evenly between formal 
meetings and informally between positions.  Therefore, formalization is initially set to 
medium. 
d. Matrix Strength.  As discussed previously in Chapter III, Section C.5.d., 
the model's matrix strength setting (high, medium, or low) represents the amount of 
informal and formal information exchanges between workers and how workers perceive 
necessary meeting attendance.  Matrix strength also measures the percentage of formal 
meetings attended.  Each strength setting has corresponding probability values calculated 
during a simulation run. 
Interviews with HV Repair Cell personnel and observation of operations reveal 
informal and formal information exchanges occur routinely and evenly.  On average, 
organizational personnel attend all required meetings and communicate informally to 
learn about task completion.  Therefore, based on the information collected and compared 
with the definitions and effects of the strength settings, the baseline model's matrix 
strength value is set to medium. 
e. Communication Probability.  In Chapter III, Section C.5.e., this parameter 
is defined as the level of communication required between tasks that are independent and 
typically set with a POWer value from 0.2 to 0.9.  Interviews with organizational 
personnel and observations made during the site visit provided the researchers with the 
basis for identifying HV maintenance and administrative tasks as highly standardized and 
routine.  Additionally, the HV repair process and tasks are performed by skilled 
employees. 
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Based on interview and observational data assessment, the parameter definition, 
and understanding of its effect on the simulation, an initial communication probability 
value of 0.2 seems appropriate.  This setting means that, on average, there is a 20% 
chance a worker will need to communicate something about the task-in-progress with the 
position responsible for the linked task. 
f. Noise Probability.  Chapter III, Section C.5.f. above defines this parameter 
as the probability interruptions in an ordinary working day will take time away from HV 
Repair Cell employees conducting flight controls repair and administrative tasks.  POWer 
uses values ranging from 0.01 (low) to 1.0 (significant, but common) to represent noise 
probability. 
During interviews, personnel explained they experienced few, if any, interruptions 
because of limited exposure to interruption requests.  There are no additional duty 
assignments outside the HV Repair Cell.  Observations of the working environment 
reveal the cell is located separately from other organizations.  Their secluded location 
helps minimize worker disruptions.  Interviews and observation analysis support the 
conclusion that noise probability is extremely low, which corresponds to a 0.01 POWer 
setting. 
7. Rework Links 
Collected information demonstrates rework within the flight controls repair 
process seldom occurs.  HV Repair Cell leaders attribute infrequent rework to task 
repetition and standardization, learning-curve effects, and personnel's high skill levels.  
While rework is rarely necessary, four rework links are included in the model to represent 
the impact between interdependent tasks when rework is required.  Appendix G identifies 
the baseline HV Repair Cell model's Rework Link Property Panel Settings. 
For example, there is a rework link between the driver ("upstream") task Buildup 
of Horizontal Stabilizers (Buildup-H) and the dependent task Average Repair of 
Horizontal Stabilizers (Average Repair-H).  The initial rework strength associated with 
this dependent task is 0.3% as shown in Figure 9.   
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The 0.3% value indicates that if a project exception occurs within the Buildup-H 
task, which causes rework, 0.3% of the Average Repair-H task (duration:  19,674 minutes 
x 0.3% = 60 minutes) will be added to the project duration on average.  This additional 
time is consistent with information supplied by repair cell personnel. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Sample Property Panel for Rework Link 
 
The following two parameters illustrate how the repair cell handles significant 
exceptions during the flight controls repair process. 
a. Functional Exception Probabilities.  As discussed previously in       
Chapter III, Section C.6.a., this parameter describes the probability repair tasks fail due to 
localized task errors and require rework by the position responsible for completing the 
task.  POWer measures this parameter based on values from 0.05 (low) to                    
0.10 (significant, but common).  Interviews and observations validate flight controls 
repair involves well-understood technology, established technical orders, and 
standardized work processes.  Data supports the assessment functional exception 
probability is extremely low; therefore, the value is set to 0.05 for the baseline model. 
b. Project Exception Probabilities.  Chapter III, Section C.6.b. explains this 
parameter is the probability repair tasks will fail and generate rework for dependent tasks 
connected by the rework links within the model.  POWer employs the probability 
setting—typically a value between 0.05 (low) and 0.10 (significant, but common)—
during the simulation to generate project exceptions.  Information collected supports the 
determination that HV Repair Cell repair and administrative tasks entail routine work-
processes.  Thus, the baseline project exception probability value is set to 0.05. 
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8. Communication Links 
Collected information defines technically interdependent and tightly coordinated 
tasks.  Along with the four rework links, there are four communication links included in 
the model to represent highly integrated tasks requiring information-sharing between 
positions.  Appendix H lists the baseline HV Repair Cell model's Communication Link 
Property Panel Settings. 
For example, there is a communication link between the Buildup-H task and the 
Average Repair-H task.  This ensures aircraft mechanics and sheet metal mechanics 
responsible for completing these two tasks share information about their respective tasks.  
Furthermore, the task uncertainty parameter for this communication link is set to low in 
accordance with the SimVision Users' Guide (eProjectManagement, 2003).  Since HV 
repair procedures are highly standardized, most information required to complete 
Buildup-H is available when the task begins.  On average, a low-level of communication 
exchanges occurs between position personnel if rework is required on a task. 
9. Knowledge Links 
Through interviews and personal observation, the researchers found that close 
working relationships exist between repair and administrative personnel.  For instance, 
mechanics often ask skill-level questions of the experienced team leader.  Another key 
example is the close working relationship between the team leader and planner while they 
accomplish AFMC Form 202 and Work Control Document tasks. 
Seven knowledge links are included in the model to represent knowledge-sharing 
among repair cell employees.  Appendix I depicts the baseline HV Repair Cell model's 
Knowledge Link Property Panel Settings. 
As an example, the property panel and skill-rating panel shown in Figure 10 
describe the knowledge link between sheet metal mechanics and the team leader.  To 
answer and resolve SM position inquiries, the TL position has a designated "Sheet Metal 
Mechanic Skills" skill-rating.  In the model, the TL's skill-rating parameter is set to high.  
This setting reflects the level of sheet metal skills the SM position perceives the TL 
position to possess. 
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Figure 10.   Sample Property Panel and Skill-rating Panel for SM to TL 
Knowledge Link 
 
10. Non-touch Tasks 
Along with modeling core flight controls maintenance tasks, the model analyzes 
off-core, non-touch tasks to ensure positions are occupied during the entire HV Repair 
Cell process.  The HV Repair Cell model includes eight non-touch tasks.  Non-touch 
tasks indicate periods when flight controls personnel are conducting other-than-principal 
repair and administrative tasks.  The model's non-touch tasks settings are listed in 
Appendix C, Task Property Panel Settings. 
For instance, for the "ALS' Non-touch Tasks" task, the effort parameter is set to 
60 minutes/day x 3 days/week x 7 weeks = 1260 minutes.  This duration captures when 
the ALS position is occupied and not specifically working on a core HV Repair Cell task.  
The 1260 minutes represents the time provided to employees for conducting physical 
fitness through the "Fit for Fight" program.  The 1260 minutes accounts for three         
60-minute sessions per week for the duration of the HV stabilizer repair of 7 weeks.  
Additionally, the priority parameter for each non-touch task is set to low (except for the 
"PS's Non-touch Tasks" discussed in the next paragraph) because all "core" flight 
controls repair tasks take precedence over non-touch tasks.   
The production supervisor's (PS) non-touch task has a priority parameter set to 
high.  The PS position's duties primarily entail administrative and supervisory 
responsibilities and consist of assigning daily repair tasks, preparing for daily events, 
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monitoring personnel actions, intra-organization coordination, personnel training, and 
special projects.  The only core ("touch") task included in the model for the PS is the 
"Certify Buildup Complete" task, which also has a priority parameter set to high. 
The "PS's Non-touch Tasks" effort parameter is set to 430 minutes.  These 430 
minutes are calculated by taking the time the PS position spends during a daily 8-hour 
shift and subtracting the time the PS spends at three daily meetings (Roll Call, HV 
Turnover, and Daily Tail Team): 
430 min = 480 min - [15-min Roll Call] - [20-min Turnover] - [15-min Daily Tail Team] 
Moreover, the "PS's Non-touch Tasks" effort setting ensures the model completes 
this task early in the repair process to not interfere with other tasks along the critical 
milestone path.  The PS position's non-touch task responsibilities are important to the HV 
Repair Cell's daily operations and functionality because they indirectly affect all core 
flight controls repair and administrative tasks. 
11. Time Lags 
The model represents repair of one set of horizontal and vertical stabilizers.  Both 
non-HV Repair Cells (e.g., wash/chemical strip personnel and engineers) and the HV 
Repair Cell perform direct work on all sets.  Non-HV Repair Cell tasks are modeled 
through the use of time lags and not through the use of separate task boxes.  Time delays 
account for time HV Repair Cell personnel spend waiting on non-HV Repair Cell 
maintenance functions.  Since HV Repair Cell personnel can work on up to six sets at 
once, they perform tasks on other stabilizers while non-HV repairs are conducted.   
With respect to this modeling effort, the researchers determined organizational 
interventions would only be applied to internal HV Repair Cell functions.  This research 
focuses only on direct and indirect work (i.e., coordination time, supervision time, rework 
time, and waiting time) of HV Repair Cell personnel performing flight controls repair and 
administrative tasks. 
For example, Figure 11 depicts a time lag of 492 minutes between the "Update 
PDMSS—Lug Priorities" task and the "Remove Bushings" task.  This duration accounts 
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for the average time that Nondestructive Inspection Technicians perform spot welds on 
skin splice joints, spars, and surfaces during the repair of horizontal stabilizer lugs. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Sample Property Panel to Account for Time Lag between Update 
PDMSS—Lug Priorities and Remove Bushings Tasks 
 
For AFMC Form 202s, engineers take an average of seven days to complete 
review and provide repair solutions.  However, because HV Repair Cell personnel are 
never idle, this 7-day delay to account for engineer duration is not included in the model. 
Appendix D identifies seven time lag property panels to represent time delays 
performed by outside repair organizations 
E. BASELINE MODEL 
The computational organizational model of the flight controls repair operation 
emulates the HV Repair Cell's current process and operations.  Figure 12 depicts a 
screenshot of the HV Repair Cell baseline model.  Within the screenshot, the three 
parallelograms at the top represent meetings, the eight "people" objects represent 
positions, the rectangles below the eight positions represent core "touch" tasks, the 
hexagons represent completion milestones, and the long rectangles to the upper right 
represent non-touch tasks. 
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Figure 12.   Screenshot of HV Repair Cell Baseline Model 
 
In the HV Repair Cell Model, positions and assigned tasks are color-coded with 
the same color.  Positions connect to assigned tasks using blue task-assignment arrows.  
The black arrows connecting positions to positions from the "head" represent supervisory 
roles.  The light-blue arrows connecting positions to positions from the "feet" represent 
knowledge links.  The pink arrows connecting positions to meetings represent required 
meeting attendance.  While difficult to see in the figure, four sets of arrows between tasks 
represent rework (red arrows) and communication links (green arrows).  Finally, the 
black arrows that link each task (rectangle) and milestone (hexagon), starting from the 
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HV Repair Start milestone, and ending with the HV Repair Finish milestone, represent 
sequential and parallel tasks within the HV Repair Cell process flow path. 
The validity of the baseline model's output is critical to accurately gauging the 
effects of changes (interventions) made to the baseline.  Sensitivity analysis increases 
confidence in the baseline model's validity.  The researchers reviewed the Property Panel 
parameters (Chapter III, Section D.1.) to determine which value settings could be 
changed, but still emulate the actual HV Repair Cell based on interviews, observations, 
data, and recommended SimVision guidelines. 
The communication probability parameter is selected as the ideal parameter to 
modify in order for researchers to assess impacts to the HV Repair Cell Model.  
According to the SimVision Users' Guide (eProjectManagement, 2003), this value is 
normally set in the range of 0.2 to 0.9.  As stated in Chapter III, Section D.6.e., the initial 
baseline's communication probability setting is 0.2.  To conduct the sensitivity analysis, 
the parameter is first lowered to 0.1 and then increased to 0.3. 
Table 1 illustrates the results of the sensitivity analysis.  After running each 
simulation, the researchers compared project duration output to the original baseline 
model's project duration and the historical data provided.  According to the HV Repair 
Cell, average repairs take 35 days.  The baseline's duration of 34.32 days provides the 
closest approximate result—within 1.9% of the historical 35-day turnaround time.  
Changing the communication probability setting to 0.1 or 0.3 reduces project duration by 
0.10% and 0.19% from the baseline's prediction, to 34.29 and 34.26 days respectively.  











from .2 to .1
Increased 
Comm Prob 
from .2 to .3
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 34.29 -0.10% 34.26 -0.19%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 130.52 NO CHANGE 130.52 NO CHANGE
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 29.72 -3.66% 31.46 1.96%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 5.25 4.42% 4.84 -3.85%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 17.02 -7.03% 19.48 6.39%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 7.45 -0.88% 7.15 -4.91%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 160.25 -0.70% 161.98 0.38%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $59,811.04 -1.35% $61,231.14 0.99%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days): 8.74 8.89 1.82% 8.51 -2.60%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 7.99 0.44% 7.74 -2.72%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.90 15.81% 0.76 -1.36%
Project Risk 0.07 0.08 14.71% 0.07 NO CHANGE
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 2.84 -0.92% 2.88 0.34%









Table 1.   Sensitivity Analysis for Communication Probability Parameter 
 
The flight controls repair duration predicted by the model sufficiently reflects the 
real-world duration of 35 calendar days provided by HV Repair Cell personnel.  The 
accuracy and consistency of the model improves the probability that running the 
simulation predicts realistic outputs.  Therefore, the HV Repair Cell model can be used to 
forecast performance outputs regarding flight controls repair duration, direct and 
indirect/hidden work, project cost and risk, and exception-handling. 
Running the baseline model helps the model's operator identify potential problem 
areas.  Examples of problem areas include:  hotspot areas, position and task backlog, 
unrealistic or hard-to-achieve schedules, and increased project duration or risk.  Hotspot 
areas may increase project duration and/or project risk.  Positions may experience 
backlog resulting from:  task buildup, large durations of direct work, time spent 
coordinating interdependent tasks, time spent answering questions from subordinates 
needing problem-resolution or task-completion assistance, and time spent attending 
project meetings.  Because communication quality risks are correlated with project 
failure, tasks with a higher potential for low-quality work-related communications may 
become critical issues and harder for leaders to correct later. 
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Additionally, position and task backlog may cause project bottlenecks and 
increase decision waiting time, which ultimately affects project risk.  For example, the 
HV Repair Cell model predicts whether or not aircraft or sheet metal mechanics are 
impacted if the team leader becomes backlogged.  The model highlights this "domino 
effect" by portraying tasks and positions compelled to wait by other backlogged actors.  
Backlogged personnel may lose valuable time trying to catch up with their work, miss 
coordinating with interdependent colleagues, or fail to attend important meetings. 
The model may also be used to identify organizational design parameters that 
negatively impact project and functional exceptions and/or increase project risk.  Certain 
tasks trigger the need for higher coordination or information-sharing and influence the 
model's output (e.g., rework and coordination output statistics).  The model's output 
facilitates development of organizational design interventions (alternative "what if" 
scenarios) to shorten repair throughput time and positively impact the repair process.  The 
researchers have modified the baseline model to examine the implications of designed 
interventions on reducing flight controls repair cycle time, risk, and cost. 
After establishing the baseline model, the researchers simulated execution of 
flight controls repair to assess realistic delays and process risks associated with the 
projected organizational design.  In addition, in order for HV Repair Cell leaders to 
reduce the impact of potential problem areas, this research identified feasible 
organization and work process modifications that meet acceptable quality and risk 
tradeoffs.   
F. INTERVENTIONS 
Once the model is determined to accurately depict current flight controls repair 
operations, the researchers developed interventions to modify the model and evaluate 
organizational design alternatives.  The model simulates specific interventions to predict 
effects on performance and likelihood of success.  Table 2 depicts the eight output 
parameters evaluated during this research, including:  simulated project duration; direct 
work time; indirect (hidden) time measured by rework time, coordination time, 
exception-handling wait time; total direct and indirect work time; total project cost; total 
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functional and project exception time measured by functional exception work and project 
exception work; project risk; and position backlog.  The output parameters are explained 






Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85
Rework Time (days) 5.03
Coordination Time (days) 18.31
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77
Project Risk 0.07
Position Backlog (days) 2.87
Position With Highest Backlog
AM2—Links 
Aircraft Mechanic  
Table 2.   Sample Output Parameters, HV Repair Cell Baseline Model 
 
Seven interventions are applied to the baseline model, including: 
1. Adding a sheet metal mechanic to the current pool of 14 sheet metal 
mechanics. 
2. Combining the AM2 position and AM7 position to create one pool of nine 
aircraft mechanics called the AM9 position. 
3. Changing the level of centralization from medium to low. 
4. Increasing the functional exception probability parameter value from 5% 
to 10%. 
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5. Combining Intervention 2 (create AM9 position) and Intervention 3 
(change centralization to low). 
6. Cross-training and combining all aircraft and sheet metal mechanics to 
create one mechanic position called "Mechanic Pool." 
7. Changing the following parameters to analyze the expected output if three 
unit personnel retire within the next two fiscal years (FY08-FY10):  team experience, 
communication probability, project exception probability, and functional exception 
probability. 
Simulating different interventions of the baseline HV Repair Cell model allows 
the researchers to quantify the impact to organizational time, cost, and risk.  Previewing 
potential organizational changes and subsequent impacts before expending resources is a 
valuable cost-effective advantage.  Furthermore, the model provides flight controls' 
decision-makers quantitative evidence for enacting prospective design modifications 
within the organization. 
1. Intervention 1—Employ One Additional Sheet Metal Mechanic 
The time (effort) spent on sheet metal mechanics' tasks is longer than the time 
spent on aircraft mechanic tasks (which include only the disassembly and buildup tasks).  
By adding an additional sheet metal mechanic to the current pool of 14 sheet metal 
mechanics, overall project duration is predicted to decrease, while project cost (reflecting 
an added HV Repair Cell employee) is predicted to increase.  This intervention provides 
insight into how much the duration to repair the stabilizers could be reduced after the 
quantity of sheet metal mechanics responsible for repairs is increased. 
2. Intervention 2—Combine AM2/AM7 Positions, Create AM9 Position 
Currently, the nine aircraft mechanics are divided into two positions responsible 
for different tasks:  two mechanics (AM2) that only repair linkages and seven mechanics 
(AM7) that perform all disassembly and buildup tasks.  Although the AM2 and AM7 
positions possess the same aircraft mechanic job-series, the AM2 position is separated to 
match overall skill-level to the "Repair Links" task's required low skill-level.  The 
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baseline model (Figure 6) contains separate positions for high-level-skilled AM7 
mechanics and low-level-skilled AM2 mechanics.  This division of labor creates two 
different types of workers with different qualifications.  Figure 13 illustrates the HV 
Repair Cell positions and information hierarchy after Intervention 2 is implemented. 
 
 
PS - Production Supervisor 
 
TL - Team Leader
 
FLS - Forward Logistic Specialist
 
ALS -   Scheduler
  
PN -   Planner 
  
AM9 - Aircraft Mechanic
SM -   Sheet Metal Mechanic 
   
Figure 13.   Intervention 2, HV Repair Cell Positions and Information Hierarchy 
 
For this intervention, AM2 and AM7 positions are combined to simulate an HV 
Repair Cell with a pool of aircraft mechanics in the "AM9" position.  This modification 
merges AM2 and AM7 personnel—allowing one AM9 position to perform all aircraft 
mechanic tasks previously assigned to the separate positions.   
For example, the AM9 position becomes responsible for the "Inspect and Repair 
Links" task instead of the AM2 position.  Figure 14 depicts apportioned tasks (boxes are 
shaded blue) for the restructured AM9 position:  Disassemble, Inspect and Repair Links, 









































































































Figure 14.   Intervention 2, Horizontal and Vertical Stabilizers Repair Cell 
Model's Milestones and Tasks 
The intervention is simulated twice (represented by Intervention 2a and 
Intervention 2b).  To allow learning-curve effects to occur over time (short-term versus 
long-term), the researchers run the intervention model first with the AM9 position's 
Aircraft Mechanic Skills setting at medium (Intervention 2a) and then with the AM9 
position's Aircraft Mechanic Skills setting at high (Intervention 2b).  By comparing the 
output of these two interventions, the results reflect time and effort involved to integrate 
the AM2 and AM7 positions.  The second intervention run with high Aircraft Mechanic 
Skills is expected to demonstrate steady-state effects of the learning curve. 
This intervention is projected to show the impact of knowledge-sharing and 
enhanced training of low-level-skilled personnel (assigned to the former AM2 position) 
on the HV repair process.  These improvements are expected to reduce overall project 
duration and decrease rework time.  Since the intervention entails learning-curve effects, 
the model may at first exhibit an increase in coordination wait time and exception-
handling wait time as AM2 members learn new tasks and ask more questions. 
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3. Intervention 3—Change Centralization from Medium to Low 
The baseline model's centralization parameter is set to medium (discussed in 
Chapter III, Sections C.5.b. and D.6.b.) as a result of assessing the organization's current 
decision-making and exception-handling responsibilities.  The centralization parameter 
for Intervention 3 is set to low.  Appendix A depicts the general property panel settings 
for Intervention 3. 
This intervention lowers the level of centralization from medium to low, thereby 
changing the organization's decision-making practices to a decentralized operation.  The 
results of this intervention are expected to simulate low levels of centralization by 
decreasing overall repair time, rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait time.  
Yet, low levels of centralization are also expected to increase project risk as HV Repair 
Cell employees seek less information from higher-level decision-makers. 
4. Intervention 4—Increase Functional Exception Probability to 10% 
The current stabilizers' repair process is routine and standardized.  This 
intervention evaluates the effects of added stress if the HV stabilizer repair process 
becomes less standardized and causes more exceptions.  Appendix A illustrates the 
general property panel settings for Intervention 4. 
Recently, stabilizers from KC-135s (undergoing PDM) assigned to units in highly 
corrosive environments (e.g., Kadena Air Base, Japan) have displayed more severe 
corrosion damage than previously experienced.  This damage impacts repair diagnosis 
and repair time by causing more exceptions during the repair process.  Thus, mechanics 
and administrators make more exception-handling inquiries to the team leader on how to 
proceed.  Additionally, the probability repair tasks fail and require rework due to errors 
increases because removing corrosion involves less standardized work procedures. 
The results of this intervention are expected to show the impact when high 
corrosion becomes a more typical diagnosis during the HV repair process.  As high 
corrosion becomes the norm, repair guidance will need updating to reflect new diagnosis 
procedures.  Introducing updated guidance will change the current routine repair process 
by adding non-standardized tasks. 
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As mechanics and administrators learn the new procedures, more functional 
exceptions are predicted to occur.  To model the added stress to the system, the functional 
exception probability parameter value is increased from 5% to 10%.  Overall project 
duration, project cost, and project risk are predicted to increase as the HV Repair Cell 
learns and struggles through new operating procedures.  As strain on the flight controls 
system increases, the amount of exceptions are expected to increase considerably. 
5. Intervention 5—Combine Intervention 2b and Intervention 3 
After evaluating the simulation results of the first four interventions, the 
researchers develop a combined intervention to assess potential synergistic effects.  This 
intervention should reveal whether beneficial interventions executed in isolation result in 
the same or continued improvement when integrated.  Appendix A identifies the general 
property panel settings for Intervention 5. 
Intervention 2b (Create AM9 Position with high skills) and Intervention 3 
(Change Centralization from Medium to Low) are combined, as they are the least 
complicated and most economical organizational design changes suggested.  Lowering 
the number of HV Repair Cell positions may increase the risk of task completion, but 
should not require extensive financial resources. 
Once all aircraft mechanics attain a high skill level, HV repair process duration 
and risk are expected to decrease.  Decentralizing decision-making responsibility to the 
individual worker level presumes a commitment to empowering subordinates, but not 
increased funding.  To model this intervention, the researchers combine the AM7 and 
AM2 positions into one AM9 position with a high Aircraft Mechanics Skill setting, and 
they set the model's centralization parameter to low.   
Figure 13 illustrates the HV Repair Cell positions and information hierarchy after 
Intervention 5 is implemented (Note:  the positions and information hierarchy for 
Intervention 2 and Intervention 5 are identical).  Project duration, rework time, and cost 
are predicted to decrease, while project risk is predicted to increase. 
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6.  Intervention 6—Cross-train and Create One Mechanic Pool Position 
According to the production supervisor, current OC-ALC hiring and operating 
regulations prohibit employees from formal cross-training.  If cross-training is not 
permitted by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated between OC-ALC 
and union representatives, mechanics cannot be formally trained outside the job series 
(i.e., aircraft, sheet metal, electric, or avionics) they were hired to perform. 
The US Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) website (2007) provides 
information about the federal classification and job-grading system.  Typically, in order 
for personnel to capture cross-training among different job-series positions, the job series' 
description should be modified.  Presently, aircraft mechanics that conduct some duties or 
responsibilities of the sheet metal mechanic job series cannot receive formal credit for 
performing sheet metal work or be reclassified.  According to the OPM, in order for a 
federal employee to be reclassified into a new series, the work he/she performs must 
reflect the job series' occupational definition entirely and not just portions of that 
occupation's duties and responsibilities. 
Internally, the HV Repair Cell cross-trains personnel; however, personnel do not 
receive official credit (documented in personal records) for training outside their current 
job series.  While current rules prohibit formal credit, this intervention evaluates the 
impact if the OC-ALC CBA is renegotiated to allow formal cross-training in the future.  
Figure 15 portrays the HV Repair Cell's positions and information hierarchy after 
Intervention 6 is modeled. 
P S  - P roduction  S uperv isor
 
T L  - Team  Leader
 
FLS  - F orw ard  
Log is tic  S pec ia lis t
 
A LS  - S chedu le r
 
P N  - P lanner
 
M echan ic  P oo l
 
 
Figure 15.   Intervention 6, HV Repair Cell's Positions and Information 
Hierarchy 
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To simulate the results of cross-training aircraft and sheet metal mechanics, the 
researchers create one mechanic resource pool (called the Mechanic Pool position) with 
an FTE of 23 workers (14 SM workers + 2 AM2 workers + 7 AM7 workers). 
Figure 16 depicts new HV tasks apportioned to the restructured Mechanic Pool 
position.  The updated apportioned tasks for the Mechanic Pool position include:  
disassembly, general HV inspection, inspection and repair of linkages, removal of 
bushings, grease and buff lugs, ammonium persulphate, inspection of vertical lugs, HV 








































































































Figure 16.   Intervention 6, Horizontal and Vertical Stabilizers Repair Cell 
Model's Milestones and Tasks 
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The workers assigned to the Mechanic Pool position require training and 
certification to complete disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup tasks.  Cross-
training of mechanics increases understanding of the HV repair process.  Additional 
training time affects the Mechanic Pool's skill capabilities and settings.  Therefore, within 
the model, the Mechanic Pool position possesses medium Aircraft Mechanic Skills and 
medium Sheet Metal Mechanic Skills. 
This intervention is designed to increase learning and sharing of information, 
knowledge, and experience among position personnel.  Additionally, this intervention is 
anticipated to make accomplishing disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup tasks 
more efficient, since only one position (versus three positions) is now responsible for 
these tasks.  Thus, project duration, cost, and risk are expected to decrease.  As one 
position becomes accountable for all mechanic tasks, indirect work time is also predicted 
to decrease.  With 23 mechanics working together and relying on each other to complete 
repair tasks, the amounts of exceptions generated by the model, while presumed to be 
handled quickly by the position, are expected to increase. 
7. Intervention 7—Retirement Intervention 
In 2007, the 76th Maintenance Wing offered voluntary retirement incentives 
(under the federal government’s Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay program) to 
retirement-eligible personnel as part of the Wing's reshaping efforts to match the 
workforce with workload requirements (Daniel, 2007).  This intervention simulates and 
helps identify the effect on the HV Repair Cell if another retirement incentive program is 
offered.  According to the HV Repair Cell’s shop supervisor, two sheet metal mechanics 
and one aircraft mechanic are eligible to retire between 30 September 2007 and             
30 September 2009. 
To model this intervention, the following four parameters are changed:  team 
experience from medium to low, project exception probability from 5% to 10%, 
functional exception probability from 5% to 10%, and communication probability from 
20% to 40%.  Refer to Appendix A for the general property panel settings for 
Intervention 7. 
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Parameter changes represent the increase of overall information sharing, transfer, 
and interaction required to accomplish interdependent tasks.  After three experienced 
members of the HV Repair Cell retire, organizational experience will decrease.  Future 
HV Repair Cell personnel have less experience with flight controls repair processes and 
tasks.  Thus, the updated 10% team experience parameter accounts for positions 
processing information more slowly and coordinating more often. 
The 10% project exception probability characterizes the environment when three 
new mechanics enter the organization.  A higher project exception probability parameter 
represents additional amounts of exceptions that will occur as new members learn HV 
repair procedures.  Additionally, the 10% functional exception probability value denotes 
the higher probability that repair tasks will fail and generate rework for all dependent 
tasks when new employees join the organization. 
Finally, the 40% communication probability value signifies that, on any given 
day, there is a 40% chance position members need to communicate something about the 
task-in-progress to position members responsible for another linked task.  (Note:  the FTE 
setting is not lowered within the AM7, AM2, or SM2 positions.  The researchers presume 
the HV Repair Cell will gain replacement mechanics from other repair cells as part of 
reshaping the workforce or modifying workload requirements). 
Similar to Intervention 4, project duration, project cost, and project risk for 
Intervention 7 are predicted to increase as new HV Repair Cell personnel learn repair 
tasks and how to communicate with current HV Repair Cell personnel.  As stress on the 
flight controls repair system increases, the amount of exceptions generated by the model 
is expected to increase extensively. 
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This chapter is divided into three sections:  an evaluation of the baseline model, 
an analysis of the output parameters calculated, and a detailed breakdown of the seven 
interventions modeled. 
B. BASELINE MODEL EVALUATION 
The duration of the critical path required to accomplish flight controls 
maintenance is calculated to be 34.32 days, on average.  Flight controls repair duration 
predicted by the model closely reflects the real-world duration provided by HV Repair 
Cell leaders.  The model’s prediction of flight controls repair time is within 1.9% of the 
existing 35-day average repair time.  An approximate estimation for the baseline model 
improves the likelihood that running simulations will provide credible results.  Therefore, 
the HV Repair Cell baseline model may be used as a starting point to develop 
interventions and analyze subsequent flight controls repair modifications. 
C. OUTPUT PARAMETERS 
The eight output parameters evaluated include:  simulated project duration, direct 
work time, indirect work time (including rework time, coordination time, exception-
handling wait time), total direct and indirect work time, total project cost, total functional 
and project exception time (including functional exception work and project exception 
work), project risk, and position backlog (Table 2 includes a sample illustration of output 
parameters).  The parameters selected for evaluation are expected to have the most 
impact on HV Repair Cell processes and operations. 
1. Simulated Project Duration 
Simulated project duration is the amount of time, on average, the entire HV 




tasks for one set of KC-135 horizontal and vertical stabilizers.  Project duration for each 
intervention and the baseline model is compared quantitatively and qualitatively with 
regard to risk and cost tradeoffs. 
2. Direct Work Time 
Direct work time measures the amount of time positions consume as they perform 
HV Repair Cell tasks before handling any exceptions generated by the model.  Direct 
work time for each intervention and the baseline model is compared quantitatively and 
qualitatively with regard to risk and time tradeoffs. 
3. Indirect Work Time 
Total indirect or "hidden" work time incorporates rework time, coordination time, 
and exception-handling wait time. 
a. Rework Time.  Rework time is the time all positions need during the flight 
controls repair process to carry out rework generated by the simulation.  This time 
measures the impact if a driver task fails, causing rework time for all dependent tasks 
linked to the driver task by one of the HV Repair Cell model's four rework links.  Rework 
time for each intervention and the baseline model is evaluated quantitatively and 
qualitatively with regard to risk and cost tradeoffs. 
b. Coordination Time.  Coordination time is the amount of time positions 
spend attending meetings and processing information requests from other HV Repair Cell 
positions.  If HV Repair Cell personnel do not possess previous experience to complete 
repair and administrative tasks, more communication and information-sharing is required, 
and the model generates more coordination time.  Coordination time for each intervention 
is contrasted with the baseline model quantitatively and qualitatively with regard to risk 
and resource opportunity costs. 
c. Exception-handling Wait Time.  This output parameter is also known as 
decision wait time.  Exception-handling wait time measures the time positions consume 
waiting for a response from their supervisor about how to resolve functional or project 
exceptions generated by the model.  If the supervisor is managing other tasks or positions 
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and becomes backlogged, personnel may make a default decision (ignore or quickly fix 
the error) and cause project risk to escalate.  Exception-handling wait time for each 
intervention and the baseline model is compared quantitatively and qualitatively 
pertaining to risk and cost tradeoffs. 
4. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time 
Total direct and indirect work time is the sum of direct work time plus all indirect 
work time (including rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait times).  Total 
direct and indirect work time for each intervention is weighed against the baseline model 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
5. Total Project Cost 
Total project cost is examined for each intervention and compared to the baseline 
model's total project cost.  The model allows entry of fixed cost for each represented task 
(if known) and the salary of each position (if known).  The default fixed cost setting is $0 
for each task.  The default salary setting for each position is $50 per hour.  Although the 
"true" cost of conducting the HV repair tasks and employing HV Repair Cell positions is 
not modeled for this research, both default settings ($0 and $50 respectively) are used in 
the HV Repair Cell model to monitor relative changes. 
Using the default settings allows the researchers to assess relative change in total 
project cost for each intervention as compared to the baseline model's total project cost.  
By increasing and decreasing costs, researchers can illustrate the financial impact of 
instituting organizational design modifications.  Total project cost (the sum of direct 
work cost, rework cost, coordination cost, and exception-handling wait cost) is compared 
quantitatively and qualitatively with regard to risk and time opportunity costs. 
6. Total Functional and Project Exception Time 
Total functional and project exception time is the sum of the time for positions to 
complete work on exceptions (rework) generated by the model's functional exception 
probability and project exception probability settings. 
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a. Functional Exception Time.  This value represents the amount of time HV 
Repair Cell positions consume repairing specific tasks that fail and require rework. 
b. Project Exception Time.  This output value records the time that positions 
take repairing failed tasks and dependent tasks (attached in the HV Repair Cell model by 
rework links). 
Total functional and project exception time for each intervention and the baseline 
model are compared quantitatively and qualitatively. 
7. Project Risk 
According to the SimVision Users' Guide (eProjectManagement, 2003), project 
risk represents the probability horizontal and vertical stabilizer components repaired 
during the HV repair process are not integrated at the end of the HV repair process 
because they have defects following rework and exception-handling.  The Guide states 
project risk values typically range from 0.01 to 0.99.  For example, a 0.4 value indicates 
multiple failures are not being reworked by flight controls personnel.  Moreover, risk can 
never equal 1.0 and can only equal 0.0 if no exceptions in the HV repair process occur. 
The project risk output reflects the model's initial input parameters, number of 
project exceptions generated, rework and coordination wait times, and inability of 
supervisors to quickly perform exception-handling.  The project exception probability 
input for each model creates the model's project risk output.  Model settings for project 
exception probability are 0.05 for the baseline and all interventions except Interventions 4 
and 7, in which the settings are 0.10.  
After running the simulation for the baseline model and each intervention, a low 
project risk value indicates successful integration on average, while a high project risk 
value indicates unsuccessful integration on average.  Project risk for each intervention 
and the baseline model is compared quantitatively and qualitatively with regard to cost 
and time tradeoffs. 
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8. Position Backlog 
Position backlog depicts the number of days of direct and indirect work a position 
has yet to accomplish.  The position summary statistics provided by POWer 3.0a 
software include the maximum backlog time for each position and the date maximum 
backlog begins.  Positions with elevated backlog may increase the probability of longer 
simulated project duration and higher project risk.  Both the position with the highest 
position backlog and the amount of backlog for that position are presented for each 
intervention and the baseline model to assess shifts in responsibility and backlog 
differences. 
D. BREAKDOWN OF INTERVENTIONS 
This section summarizes the results of the seven interventions applied to the 
baseline model.  Appendix J provides a comparative snapshot of the baseline model and 
interventions' numerical and relative (increase or decrease) output parameter results.  In 
addition, Appendix J presents the differences between each intervention and the baseline 
in days, hours, and as a percentage of the baseline's output. 
With regards to percentages, Table 3 depicts how the differences between 
intervention and baseline models are assessed within the Chapter IV, Results section: 
 
Value (X) Level of Relevance
X < 1% No Relevant Difference
1% ≤ X < 5% Weakly Relevant Difference
5% ≤ X <10% Relevant Difference
X > 10% Highly Relevant Difference  
Table 3.   Output Value Levels of Relevance 
 
1. Intervention 1—Employ One Additional Sheet Metal Mechanic 
Intervention 1 adds another sheet metal mechanic to the current resource pool of 




Model Intervention 1 % Change
Numerical Output
Starting Point
Add One SM 
Mechanic
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 33.90 -1.22%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 130.52 0.00%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 31.43 1.87%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 5.14 2.24%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 18.72 2.23%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 7.57 0.75%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 161.95 0.36%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $60,841.87 0.35%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 8.71 -0.30%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 7.82 -1.61%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.88 13.14%
Project Risk 0.07 0.08 16.48%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 2.85 -0.64%




Aircraft Mechanic  
Table 4.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Intervention 1 
 
a. Simulated Project Duration.  The researchers predicted this modification 
would reduce overall HV repair process time (simulated project duration).  The 
intervention results support this prediction, as project duration decreases from 34.32 days 
(274.56 hours) to 33.9 days (271.2 hours).  This reduction is considered weakly relevant 
because the 3.36-hour decrease is only 1.22% shorter than the baseline model's simulated 
project duration. 
b. Direct Work Time.  The amount of direct work time for Intervention 1 is 
equal to direct work time for the baseline model—both are 130.52 days.  This result 
indicates that adding an additional sheet metal mechanic does not affect the amount of 
direct work to be completed during the HV repair process.  The number of responsible 
tasks assigned to the position remains unchanged. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  On the other hand, adding another sheet metal 
mechanic increases the amount of total indirect work time.  Hidden work time (including 
rework, coordination, and exception-handling times) grows from 30.85 days (246.8 
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hours) to 31.43 days (251.44 hours).  This 4.64-hour difference is a 1.87% increase over 
the baseline model and considered weakly relevant.  The change suggests extra sheet 
metal mechanics performing maintenance create additional rework opportunities and 
coordination requirements with supervisors and coworkers.  Furthermore, additional 
mechanics increase the probability inquiries and questions will be required of supervisors            
(i.e., exception-handling). 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  Total direct and indirect work time 
for Intervention 1 is 161.95 days, which is 4.62 hours higher than the baseline model's 
161.38 days.  Although this 0.36% increase equates to an irrelevant difference, the law of 
diminishing marginal returns may explain the rise.  By applying the law of diminishing 
marginal returns, the researchers can demonstrate that, beyond some point, each 
additional mechanic yields less and less additional output.  Only so many mechanics can 
physically work on and repair stabilizers at a given time.  Thus, adding another sheet 
metal mechanic to decrease project duration may not be worth the cost of generating 
more indirect (hidden) work. 
e. Total Project Cost.  Total project cost for Intervention 1 increases to 
$60,841.87 from the baseline's $60,627.98—a $213.89 (0.35%) difference.  The relative 
change in project cost is influenced by the cost associated with increased rework (2.24% 
higher), coordination (2.23% higher), and exception-handling (0.75% higher) wait time. 
f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  Total functional and project 
exception time reduces from 8.74 days to 8.71 days.  Even if the new member asks more 
questions of the team leader when correcting project exceptions and failed tasks, overall, 
more SM position members are available to perform rework than in the baseline model 
(14 FTEs versus 13 FTEs).  For the purpose of this research, the 0.3% decrease         
(0.21 hours/12.6 minutes) is deemed irrelevant.  Furthermore, the technology and HV 
repair process has not changed. 
g. Project Risk.  As shown in Table 4, project risk for Intervention 1 is 0.08.  
This is an increase of 16.48% over the baseline's project risk of 0.07; such an increase is 
deemed highly relevant.  The risk value reflects additional risk in the system when more 
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workers (29 FTEs versus 28 FTEs in the baseline) participate in the repair process.  Extra 
workers generally create more exceptions, which increases the probability the model 
generates more rework, coordination, and exception-handling.  Higher project risk 
indicates a lower probability of successful HV Repair Cell integration, on average. 
h. Position Backlog.  Lastly, the AM2 position is the highest backlogged 
position in both the baseline and Intervention 1 models.  While the amount of backlog 
reduces from 2.87 days to 2.85 days, the 0.64% reduction (0.15 hours or 9 minutes) 
implies there is no relevant difference. 
2. Intervention 2—Combine AM2/AM7 Positions, Create AM9 Position 
Intervention 2 unites AM2 with AM7 mechanics to create one AM9 position for 
all HV Repair Cell aircraft mechanics.  Table 5 depicts Intervention 2a, Intervention 2b, 
and the baseline model's differences and similarities. 
 
Baseline 











Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 34.21 -0.34% 33.46 -2.52%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 127.90 -2.01% 127.90 -2.01%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 33.24 7.75% 31.22 1.19%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 4.93 -2.03% 4.96 -1.49%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 18.82 2.80% 18.65 1.88%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 9.50 26.36% 7.61 1.29%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 161.14 -0.15% 159.12 -1.40%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $64,767.71 6.83% $56,739.93 -6.41%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 9.27 6.14% 8.86 1.44%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 8.34 4.94% 7.81 -1.76%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.92 18.25% 1.04 33.81%
Project Risk 0.07 0.09 32.11% 0.10 40.43%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 1.69 -41.26% 1.55 -45.99%
Position With Highest Backlog
AM2—Links 
Aircraft Mechanic
TL—Team Leader TL—Team Leader
 
Note:  TL position's backlog under the Baseline Model is 1.53 days 
Table 5.   Comparison of Baseline Model, Intervention 2a, and Intervention 2b 
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As described in Chapter III, Section F.2., the intervention is simulated twice to 
allow learning effects to occur after combining low-level-skilled AM2 aircraft mechanics 
with high-level-skilled AM7 aircraft mechanics.  The researchers predicted shorter 
overall project duration and coordination time, and an increase in exception-handling and 
wait time as AM2 members learn new tasks and ask questions. 
a. Simulated Project Duration.  The Intervention 2a results confirm a 
decrease in total project duration to 34.21 days when compared to the baseline's 34.32 
days.  This 55.8-minute reduction (or 0.34% improvement) is deemed to have no relevant 
difference.  For the Intervention 2b run, total project duration further decreases 2.52% 
from the baseline to 33.46 days.  This improvement is regarded as weakly relevant.  
Intervention 2b's project duration is the second lowest of the seven interventions 
(Intervention 6 has the shortest duration and is discussed later).  It is 6.92 hours faster 
than the baseline and 6 hours faster than the Intervention 2a simulation. 
b. Direct Work Time.  Intervention 2a's output shows that direct work time 
shrinks by 2.63 days (from 130.52 days to 127.90 days)—a weakly relevant 2.01% 
reduction.  Intervention 2b direct work time is the same as Intervention 2a.  These results 
suggest that combining personnel and tasks under the AM9 position decreases the amount 
of direct work completed during the HV repair process.  Flight controls repair and 
administrative tasks formerly assigned to eight separate positions (Figure 6) are now 
assigned to seven positions (Figure 13) and may be more efficiently performed. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  As shown by Table 5, total indirect work time (sum 
of rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait times) for Intervention 2a climbs 
3.61 days to 33.24 days from the baseline's 30.85 days.  This overall 7.75% rise is 
deemed relevant.  In comparison, total indirect time for Intervention 2b only climbs 2.96 
hours (to 31.22 days) from the baseline.  This 1.19% increase over the baseline's 30.85 
days is considered weakly relevant. 
The indirect work time results demonstrate the impact of combining positions that 
possess different skill levels.  Total indirect time for Intervention 2b is 2.02 days lower 
than Intervention 2a—a relevant improvement of 6.08%.  This improvement suggests that 
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once all nine aircraft mechanics possess high-level skills, the amount of rework, 
coordination, and exception-handling wait time in the HV repair process should improve. 
For both intervention runs, rework time decreases, coordination time increases, 
and exception-handling wait time increases relative to the baseline model.  As depicted in 
Table 5, the most relevant increase is observed under exception-handling wait time.  The 
baseline's 7.51 days jumps 26.36% to 9.5 days with the Intervention 2a run, but only 
1.29% to 7.61 days with the Intervention 2b run. 
Intervention 2a involves two aircraft mechanics increasing from low to medium 
skills and seven aircraft mechanics decreasing from high to medium skills.  Conversely, 
Intervention 2b contains nine aircraft mechanics possessing high skills.  The reduced 
rework time displayed by Interventions 2a and 2b suggests that improving the low-level-
skilled AM2 mechanics to either medium-level or high-level decreases the total amount 
of rework experienced within the HV Repair Cell.  Additionally, both the increased 
coordination time and exception-handling wait time depicted by the two intervention 
results reflect the effort involved to generate and process additional information requests. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  The change in total direct and 
indirect work time from the baseline to Intervention 2a shows no relevant difference—
with a 0.15% reduction (by 1.87 hours) from the baseline's 161.38 days to 161.14 days.  
For Intervention 2b, the change in total direct and indirect work time (to 159.12 days 
from the baseline) is a weakly relevant 1.4% reduction (by 18.07 hours).  For these given 
time reductions, the primary difference is attributed to the decrease in direct work time, 
as total indirect work time increases in both intervention runs. 
e. Total Project Cost.  The total project cost for Intervention 2a increases 
relevantly by 6.83% to $64,767.71 from the baseline's cost of $60,627.98.  In contrast, 
the total project cost for Intervention 2b decreases relevantly by 6.41% to $56,739.93.  
These results suggest it is less expensive to realign tasks formerly performed by eight 
positions to fewer positions (now seven)—as long as the newly created AM9 position 
includes aircraft mechanics with high skills, not medium or low skills.  Intervention 2b 
experiences the second lowest project cost below Intervention 5, which is discussed later. 
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f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  When compared to the 
baseline model, total functional and project exception time for Intervention 2a is 
relevantly higher—with 6.14% more time (9.27 days versus 8.74 days).  For Intervention 
2b, total functional and project exception time also increase, but by a weakly relevant 
difference of 1.44% to 8.86 days. 
Breaking down the total functional and project exception time into individual 
components, Intervention 2a reveals both a higher amount of functional exception work 
as positions repair specific failed tasks (8.34 days versus 7.95 days) and a higher amount 
of project exception work as positions repair interdependent failed tasks (0.92 day versus 
0.77 day).  In contrast to the Intervention 2a run, Intervention 2b reveals a higher amount 
of project exception work (1.04 days versus the baseline's 0.77 day), but a lower amount 
of functional exception work (7.8 days versus the baseline's 7.95 days).  These 
differences suggest the most project exceptions and least functional exceptions occur 
when there are only seven positions and the AM9 position possesses aircraft mechanics 
with high skills. 
g. Project Risk.  Project risk increases from 0.07 to 0.09 for Intervention 2a 
and from 0.07 to 0.10 for Intervention 2b.  These results imply project risk grows after 
the AM9 position is created, and fewer positions (seven versus eight) become responsible 
for the same number of HV repair tasks.  Additionally, when AM9 mechanics become 
responsible for repairing linkages, disassembly, and buildup (see Figure 14), there is a 
higher probability of errors and initiation of information requests as more mechanics are 
required to work together. 
Project risk also reflects the increased coordination and exception-handling wait 
times demonstrated after new AM9 task responsibilities take affect (as opposed to the 
previous division of labor within the baseline that indicates lower risk).  Intervention 2b 
generates the second highest project risk value following Intervention 7, which has the 
highest project risk value of 0.12 and is discussed in Chapter III, Section D.7.g.  Higher 
project risk indicates that, on average, there is a lower probability of successful HV 
Repair Cell integration. 
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h. Position Backlog.  For the final output parameter, the amount of backlog 
in Intervention 2a decreases 41.26% to 1.69 days from the baseline's 2.87 days.  For 
Intervention 2b, backlog diminishes even more to 1.55 days—a highly relevant difference 
(45.99%) from the baseline's backlog. 
The highest backlogged position (formerly the AM2 position at 2.87 days) shifts 
to the TL position for both Intervention 2a (1.69 days) and 2b (1.55 days).  Under the 
baseline model, the TL position backlog is 1.53 days.  Both Intervention 2a and 2b 
increase the TL position backlog by 10.5% and 1.61% respectively.  However, the overall 
backlog time improvement implies the new AM9 position does not become backlogged 
beyond 1.69 days with either medium-level or high-level skills.  In addition, the results 
indicate once the new AM9 position is created, the TL position receives more exception-
handling inquiries than under baseline model conditions. 
3. Intervention 3—Change Centralization from Medium to Low 
Intervention 3 is designed to show the effect if leaders change the level of 
responsibility for decision-making within the HV Repair Cell.  To demonstrate this shift 
in organizational practice, the centralization parameter is changed from medium to low, 
which causes organizational decision-making to become more decentralized in lower-
level management.  This change is predicted to increase project risk and reduce repair 
process time, rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait time.  Table 6 presents a 
comparison of the baseline model and the intervention. 
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Baseline 





from Med to 
Low
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 34.15 -0.49%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 130.52 0.00%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 29.83 -3.33%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 4.92 -2.24%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 18.15 -0.85%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 6.76 -10.09%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 160.35 -0.64%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $60,224.56 -0.67%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 8.64 -1.15%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 7.82 -1.64%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.81 3.93%
Project Risk 0.07 0.08 20.51%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 2.87 0.00%
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Table 6.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Intervention 3 
 
a. Simulated Project Duration.  The results show the total project duration 
decreases from 34.32 days to 34.15 days.  This reduction of only 1.35 hours is a 0.49% 
change from the baseline; therefore, the simulation shows an irrelevant difference. 
b. Direct Work Time.  The amount of direct work time for Intervention 3 is 
the same as the baseline model of 130.52 days.  This result reflects that changing the 
level of centralization for the HV Repair Cell model will not affect any of the task 
durations or position parameters.  Therefore, decentralizing decision-making does not 
affect the amount of direct work time performed. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  The intervention results demonstrate a lower total 
indirect time—down from 30.85 days to 29.83 days, a weakly relevant difference of 
3.33%.  Table 6 shows rework time, coordination time, and exception-handling wait time 
fall (as compared to the baseline model) by 2.24%, 0.85%, and 10.09% respectively.  
These outputs suggest that moving the level of decision-making responsibility within the 
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HV Repair Cell to lower-level subordinate positions decreases the amount of rework, 
coordination, and exception-handling wait time. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  The sum change in total direct work 
and indirect work time from the baseline model is a decrease of 1.03 days—from       
161.38 days to 160.35 days.  This 0.64% difference is deemed irrelevant. 
e. Total Project Cost.  The total project cost for Intervention 3 decreases by 
$403.42, from $60,627.98 to the amount of $60,224.56.  This 0.67% change in total 
project cost demonstrates there is no relevant difference.  The small change in cost is 
attributable to the small net decreases in rework, coordination, and exception-handling 
wait times.  This is a byproduct of employees not having to appeal to supervisors for 
many decisions. 
f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  The total functional and 
project exception time changes from 8.74 days to 8.64 days, a weakly relevant difference 
of 1.15%.  Further examination shows project exception work time increases 0.24 hours 
(3.93% difference), and functional exception work time decreases 1.04 hours (1.64% 
difference). 
g. Project Risk.  Table 6 shows project risk for Intervention 3 increases to 
0.08.  Compared to the baseline risk of 0.07, this 20.51% difference in risk is regarded as 
highly relevant.  This result suggests risk increases when the worker-level (i.e., the ALS, 
PN, FLS, AM2, AM7, and SM positions designated with st role assignments) does not 
wait for the TL or PS supervisors to decide how to handle exceptions.  In a situation of 
decreased centralization, workers are more apt to ignore or quickly fix errors that occur in 
HV repair process.  Increased project risk indicates that, on average, there is a lower 
probability of successful HV Repair Cell integration. 
h. Position Backlog.  The amount of backlog for Intervention 3 remains the 
same as the baseline model at 2.87 days, and the AM2 position remains the highest 
backlogged position in both the baseline and Intervention 3 models.  These results 
indicate that decentralizing decision-making within the HV Repair Cell should neither 
increase the amount of backlog nor change the highest backlogged position. 
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4. Intervention 4—Increase Functional Exception Probability to 10% 
Intervention 4 simulates the effects of increased stress on the flight controls repair 
process, in this case as a result of higher-than-normal stabilizer corrosion damage.  High 
corrosive damage impacts diagnosis, repair time, and effort to generate new repair 
procedures.  These changes introduce more exceptions and exception-handling time into 
standardized work processes.  To emulate this scenario, the functional exception 
probability parameter value is increased from 5% to 10%.  This increase causes the 
model to generate more exceptions, which requires supervisors to handle more exception-
handling inquiries from workers.  Additionally, the probability that repair tasks will fail 
due to errors and require rework becomes higher. 
Overall project duration, project cost, and project risk are predicted to increase as 
the HV Repair Cell initiates new operating procedures.  As strain on the flight controls 
system increases, the amount of exceptions are expected to increase considerably.     
Table 7 provides an illustration of the baseline model and Intervention 4. 
 
Baseline 





from 5% to 
10% 
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 34.98 1.92%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 130.52 0.00%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 43.36 40.53%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 10.06 99.99%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 19.41 6.01%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 13.89 84.81%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 173.88 7.75%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $65,543.84 8.11%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 16.61 90.15%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 15.71 97.57%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.89 14.93%
Project Risk 0.07 0.08 17.52%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 2.98 3.66%
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Table 7.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Intervention 4 
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a. Simulated Project Duration.  Intervention 4 demonstrates total project 
duration increases from 34.32 days to 34.98 days, a weakly relevant 1.92% rise from the 
baseline model. 
b. Direct Work Time.  The results of Intervention 4 show the same amount of 
direct work time as the baseline model of 132.52 days.  Since direct work time represents 
the amount of work positions perform on tasks before handling any exceptions, a change 
in the functional exception probability parameter does not affect the resulting direct work 
time measurement. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  Increasing the functional exception probability 
parameter generates more exceptions than occur in the baseline, which then require more 
rework, coordination, and exception-handling wait time.  This effect is supported by 
Intervention 4's results—showing a highly relevant 40.53% increase in total indirect work 
time (43.36 days) over the baseline of 30.85 days.  As illustrated in Table 7, rework time, 
coordination time, and exception-handling wait time rise (in comparison to the baseline) 
by 99.99%, 6.01%, and 84.81% respectively. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  The change of the intervention's 
total direct and indirect work time is 12.5 days higher than the baseline, moving from 
161.38 days to 173.88 days.  This 7.75% difference is considered relevant. 
e. Total Project Cost.  Total project cost for Intervention 4 is $65,543.84, an 
increase of $4,915.87 from the $60,627.98 baseline cost.  This 8.11% change is relevant 
and may be attributable to vast increases in rework wait time, coordination wait time, and 
exception-handling wait time. 
f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  The total functional and 
project exception time for Intervention 4 rises from 8.74 days to 16.61 days, a highly 
relevant difference of 90.15%.  Compared to the baseline's results, functional exception 
time is 7.76 days higher (a 97.57% change), and project exception work time is 0.12 days 
higher (a 14.93% change).  According to the SimVision Users' Guide 
(eProjectManagement, 2003), it is natural to have disparate changes—such as a highly 
relevant difference in functional exception time—when adjusting the functional exception 
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probability.  A change in this parameter causes the model to generate additional 
functional exceptions.  Therefore, more repair tasks will fail—due to localized task 
errors—and require rework by the responsible position. 
g. Project Risk.  As shown in Table 7, project risk increases to 0.08.  This 
17.52% difference from the baseline project risk of 0.07 is considered highly relevant.  
Higher risk is a consequence of more exceptions, multiple decisions regarding these 
exceptions, and rework and coordination occurring throughout the repair process.  Higher 
project risk indicates a lower probability of successful HV Repair Cell integration, on 
average. 
h. Position Backlog.  The amount of backlog increases from the baseline's 
2.87 days to 2.98 days, a weakly relevant difference of 3.66%.  The AM2 position 
remains the highest backlogged position for the baseline and Intervention 4.  These 
results indicate that when more functional exceptions occur during the HV repair process, 
the AM2 position may experience additional backlog. 
5. Intervention 5—Combine Intervention 2b and Intervention 3 
Intervention 5 integrates the changes of Interventions 2b and 3 by combining the 
AM2 and AM7 aircraft mechanic positions into one AM9 aircraft mechanic position and 
modifying the centralization parameter from medium to low.  These changes are 
predicted to create mixed results demonstrating the complex tradeoffs decision-makers 
encounter between time, cost, and risk. 
Table 8 illustrates a comparison of the baseline model and Intervention 5; Table 9 
shows the simulation results for the baseline model and Interventions 2b, 3, and 5. 
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Baseline 




(AM 9 Position & 
Low 
Centralization)
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 33.51 -2.37%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 127.90 -2.01%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 30.03 -2.66%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 4.75 -5.51%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 18.70 2.12%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 6.58 -12.40%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 157.93 -2.14%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $56,280.97 -7.17%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days): 8.74 8.43 -3.48%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 7.47 -6.07%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 0.95 22.78%
Project Risk 0.07 0.09 36.49%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 1.51 -47.56%





Note:  TL position's backlog under the Baseline Model is 1.53 days 














from Med to Low
Combination 
(AM 9 Position 
& Low 
Centralization)
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 33.46 34.15 33.51
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 127.90 130.52 127.90
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 31.22 29.83 30.03
Rework Time (days) 5.03 4.96 4.92 4.75
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 18.65 18.15 18.70
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 7.61 6.76 6.58
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 159.12 160.35 157.93
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $56,739.93 $60,224.56 $56,280.97
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days): 8.74 8.86 8.64 8.43
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 7.81 7.82 7.47
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 1.04 0.81 0.95
Project Risk 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.09
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 1.55 2.87 1.51
Position With Highest Backlog
AM2—Links 
Aircraft Mechanic




Table 9.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Interventions 2b, 3, and 5 
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a. Simulated Project Duration. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  Intervention 5 exhibits a 6.52-hour project 
duration decrease from 34.32 days to 33.51 days.  This 2.37% difference is regarded as 
weakly relevant.  Of all seven interventions, Intervention 5 has the third smallest 
relevance, behind Intervention 6 and Intervention 2b.  The results demonstrate that by 
reducing the number of positions responsible for HV repair processes and by empowering 
lower-level subordinates to resolve issues at their level, decision-makers may reduce 
repair completion time. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  Intervention 5 is 0.05 days 
(0.4 hours) higher than Intervention 2b—a 0.15% increase—and 0.64 days (5.12 hours) 
lower than Intervention 3—a 1.89% decrease.  These percentage differences are regarded 
as irrelevant and weakly relevant respectively.  The results suggest that the creation of 
one resource pool of aircraft mechanics has more impact on project duration than the 
adjustment of decision-making responsibilities. 
b. Direct Work Time. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  The amount of direct work time shrinks 
2.62 days from 130.52 days to 127.90 days.  This 2.01% reduction is weakly relevant.  
The small difference indicates that combining aircraft mechanics into one resource pool 
responsible for the same number of tasks (as the baseline model) may increase the 
availability of mechanics.  As the likelihood of an aircraft mechanic becoming available 
increases, direct work spreads among mechanics slightly more efficiently than currently, 
and the amount of direct work time within the HV Repair Cell process decreases. 
 (2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  The direct work time for 
Interventions 5 is 127.90 days.  This time is the same as Intervention 2b, while the time in 
Intervention 3 is 130.52 days (identical to the baseline model).  This indicates the 
decrease in amount of direct work is a result of combining the aircraft mechanics and 
tasks into one position (AM9), but not from changing the centralization parameter to low.  
This observation may occur because repair and administrative tasks are performed more 
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efficiently by one resource pool.  Moreover, decentralizing decision-making does not 
affect the amount of direct work time involved in the flight controls repair process. 
c. Indirect Work Time. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  Intervention 5 experiences a higher total 
indirect work time of 30.03 days, a weakly relevant difference of 2.66% over the 
baseline's 30.85 days.  When compared to the baseline, rework time drops relevantly by 
5.51%, and coordination time rises weakly relevantly by 2.12%.  These results suggest 
fewer driver tasks fail and do not require as much rework.  However, when tasks do fail, 
more communication and information-sharing is needed between positions to resolve 
issues.  The combination of decentralizing decision-making authority and one mechanic 
resource pool produces a highly relevant difference of 12.4% for exception-handling wait 
time. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  Total indirect work time for 
Intervention 5 is 30.03 days, which is lower than Intervention 2b's 31.22 days but higher 
than Intervention 3's 29.83 days.  By examining rework, coordination, and exception-
handling wait times, the researchers can help explain these results.  As shown in Table 9, 
Intervention 5 has the lowest amount of rework time (4.75 days) when measured against 
Intervention 2b (4.96 days) and Intervention 3 (4.92 days).  These findings indicate the 
synergistic effects of combining the newly created AM9 position with decentralized 
decision-making responsibility. 
As discussed in Interventions 2 and 3 results sections respectively, 
reducing the number of positions (Intervention 2b) increases coordination time to 18.65 
days, while a lowering the level of decision-making (Intervention 3) decreases 
coordination time to 18.15 days.  Intervention 5's coordination time of 18.70 days is the 
highest among the three simulations.  This result reflects the effort involved in processing 
additional information requests in a decentralized decision-making environment.  More 
inquiries increase time spent coordinating between HV Repair Cell coworkers and 
supervisors.  Additionally, coordination time appears to be the leading driver in the 
change of total indirect work time. 
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The exception-handling wait time for Intervention 5 is 6.58 days, which is 
lower than Intervention 2b (7.61 days) and Intervention 3 (6.76 days).  Table 9 illustrates 
that when compared to the baseline model, Intervention 2b slightly raises the exception-
handling wait time (1.29%).  Intervention 3 has the reverse effect, with considerably less 
exception-handling wait time (10.09%), which decreases exception-handling time. 
The combination of these two interventions contributes to the most 
reduction in exception-handling wait time among the three interventions.  These findings 
suggest that as lower-level subordinates are empowered to make repair decisions and 
resolve issues at their level, HV Repair Cell leaders may expect shorter rework wait time 
and exception-handling wait time, but higher coordination wait time. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  The change in total direct and indirect 
work time is a decrease of 3.45 days from 161.38 days to 157.93 days—a weakly relevant 
difference of 2.14%. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  Overall direct and indirect 
work time for Intervention 2b is 1.4% less, and Intervention 3 is 0.64% less than the 
baseline model.  Intervention 5 appears to increase the effects of the individual 
modifications by lowering the total direct and indirect work time beyond Interventions 2b 
and 3 respectively. 
e. Total Project Cost. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  The total project cost for Intervention 5 
decreases by $4,347, from $60,627.98 to $56,280.97—a relevant 7.17% difference.  
Additionally, the project cost for Intervention 5 is the smallest of all seven interventions. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  Similar to the total direct and 
indirect work time results, the Intervention 5 model seems to promote the effects of the 
two individual interventions.  While Intervention 2b has 6.41% less project cost, and 
Intervention 3 has 0.67% less project cost, the Intervention 5 project cost is the lowest of 
the three interventions when compared to the baseline's project cost. 
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f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  Total functional and project exception time 
for Intervention 5 drops 2.43 hours, from 8.74 days to 8.43 days—a weakly relevant 
difference of 3.48%.  Separating total time into individual components, functional 
exception work decreases by 6.07%, and project exception work increases by 22.78%.  
These percentage changes represent the impact of failed tasks and subsequent rework by 
either individual positions or dependently linked positions (connected by rework links in 
the model).  Additionally, the Intervention 5 values for functional project work time and 
total functional and project exception work time are the best of all seven intervention 
simulations. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  As Table 9 illustrates (and as 
the researchers elaborated in the respective results sections previously), Intervention 2b 
reveals 33.81% more project exception work and 1.76% less functional exception work 
than the baseline.  Similarly, Intervention 3 shows 3.93% higher project exceptions and 
1.64% lower functional exceptions than the baseline.  These results suggest more project 
exceptions should be expected with seven positions (versus eight); yet, the increase may 
be dampened by decentralizing decision-making authority.  Likewise, the results indicate 
even fewer functional exceptions occur when Intervention 5's design changes are applied. 
g. Project Risk. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  As shown in Table 8, project risk for 
Intervention 5 is 0.09.  This increase is 36.49% over the baseline's project risk of 0.07 
and deemed highly relevant.  The higher output value reflects additional risk in the 
system when there are fewer positions in the HV Repair Cell and decentralized decision-
making exists.  When both of these conditions are modeled, the higher project risk 
indicates a lower probability of successful HV Repair Cell integration, on average. 
In this intervention, more project exception work (22.78% over the 
baseline) causes the model to generate additional coordination time.  Although 
Intervention 5 exhibits the third shortest project duration, third shortest indirect work 
time, second shortest total direct and indirect work time, smallest project cost, and 
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shortest total functional and project exception time, it also experiences the third highest 
project risk.  These findings illustrate the opportunity costs of time and resource savings.  
The cost of lowering HV Repair Cell time and expenses may not be worth the additional 
risk forecasted to occur. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  The project risk for 
Intervention 5 is 0.09 compared to Intervention 2b's risk of 0.10 and Intervention 3's 0.08.  
These results suggest that when the two individual interventions are combined, project 
risk is somewhat mitigated, but still more than experienced with the baseline model. 
h. Position Backlog. 
(1) Compared to Baseline:  The amount of backlog decreasing from 
2.87 days to 1.51 days is a highly relevant reduction of 47.56%.  The highest backlogged 
position switches from AM2 in the baseline model to TL in the intervention.  Under the 
baseline model, the TL position backlog is 1.53 days.  The overall backlog improvement 
implies that if the TL position supervises fewer positions, and these positions possess 
decision-making responsibilities, the HV Repair Cell experiences less backlog.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that once the AM9 position is created (with all aircraft 
mechanics possessing high-level skills), and lower-level employees are empowered, the 
TL position should receive fewer exception-handling inquiries than it does under the 
baseline model conditions.  Nonetheless, although the TL position receives less 
exception-handling questions and experiences less build up, these efficiencies may not be 
worth the impact of increased project risk on HV repair quality. 
(2) Compared to Interventions 2b and 3:  From the results identified in 
Table 9, backlog time for Intervention 5 is the lowest of the three simulations.  When 
only the centralization parameter was lowered (Intervention 3), there was no change to 
backlog time or position.  The major driver for reduced backlog time stems from 
lowering the number of positions (by forming the AM9 position) and moving which 
position is backlogged (from AM2 to TL). 
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6. Intervention 6—Cross-train and Create One Mechanic Pool Position 
Intervention 6 explores the effects of cross-training nine aircraft and 14 sheet 
metal mechanics to create one "resource pool" position—with 24 mechanics responsible 
for disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup tasks.  Table 10 illustrates the differences 
and similarities between the baseline and Intervention 6. 
 
Baseline 






Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 29.42 -14.28%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 125.27 -4.02%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 26.74 -13.34%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 3.64 -27.67%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 17.42 -4.85%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 5.68 -24.43%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 152.01 -5.80%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $60,453.35 -0.29%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 9.31 6.60%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 8.19 3.03%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 1.11 43.27%
Project Risk 0.07 0.06 -18.68%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 1.43 -50.18%





Note:  TL position's backlog under the Baseline Model is 1.53 days 
Table 10.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Intervention 6 
 
As detailed in Chapter III, Section F.6., the current OC-ALC collective bargaining 
agreement prohibits formal cross-training.  This intervention models the possible effects 
if cross-training was allowed and instituted by OC-ALC leaders and labor union 
representatives. 
The intervention's modifications are predicted to increase the efficiency of 
disassembly, inspection, repair, and buildup tasks because only one mechanic position is 
 87
responsible for all repair tasks.  The intervention's output should demonstrate a reduction 
in total HV repair process time and total direct and indirect work time. 
a. Simulated Project Duration.  The results show total project duration 
decreases from 34.32 days to 29.42 days.  This drop of 4.9 days is 14.28% lower than the 
baseline model and regarded as highly relevant.  The change suggests that increasing the 
number of mechanics capable of conducting HV repair tasks—because they possess both 
medium Aircraft Mechanic Skills and medium Sheet Metal Mechanic Skills—speeds up 
the time to complete the flight controls repair process.  Project duration for Intervention 6 
is the smallest of all seven interventions. 
b. Direct Work Time.  The amount of direct work time for Intervention 6 
shrinks 5.25 days from the baseline's 130.52 days to 125.27 days, a weakly relevant 
change of 4.02%.  This result suggests one resource pool of mechanics—as opposed to 
the baseline's three separate AM2, AM7, and SM positions—responsible for all repair 
tasks (i.e., disassembly, general HV inspection, inspection and repair of linkages, 
removal of bushings, grease and buff lugs, ammonium persulphate, inspection of vertical 
lugs, HV repair, and HV buildup) decreases the amount of direct work within the HV 
repair process. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  The output of the intervention shows less total 
indirect time—down from the baseline's 30.85 days to 26.74 days.  This decrease of 4.11 
days (32.92 hours) is a highly relevant difference of 13.34%.  In comparison to the 
baseline model, this result implies that fewer positions responsible for repair tasks may 
create lower levels of rework, coordination, and exception-handling.  When weighed 
against the baseline, rework time decreases by 27.67%; coordination time decreases by 
4.85%; and exception-handling wait time decreases by 24.43%. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  The change in total direct and 
indirect work time for Intervention 6 from the baseline is a 9.36-day decrease from 
161.38 days to 152.01 days.  This 5.8% reduction is deemed relevant. 
e. Total Project Cost.  The total project cost for Intervention 6 decreases 
$174.63, from the baseline amount of $60,627.98 to $60,453.35.  The 0.29% cost 
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difference is of no relevance.  This small change in total project cost indicates that 
creating only one resource pool of mechanics responsible for all HV repair tasks may 
reduce cost, but may not be worth the opportunity costs associated with additional 
functional and project exceptions. 
f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  The total functional and 
project exception time for Intervention 6 rises from 8.74 days to 9.31 days.  The         
0.58 days (4.61 hours) difference of 6.6% is considered relevant. 
Project exception work time (1.11 days) and functional exception time (8.19 days) 
are elevated by 43.27% and 3.03% respectively, contributing to the higher overall 
exception time. 
g. Project Risk.  As depicted in Table 10, project risk for Intervention 6 is 
0.06.  This 18.68% reduction from the baseline's project risk of 0.07 is deemed highly 
relevant.  The difference suggests reducing the number of mechanic positions from three 
to one considerably lowers project risk.  Lower project risk indicates a higher probability 
of successful HV Repair Cell integration, on average. 
h. Position Backlog.  The highest backlogged position switches from AM2 in 
the baseline model to the TL in Intervention 6.  Total backlog time decreases from      
2.87 days to 1.43 days.  This 50.18% drop of 1.44 days (11.53 hours) is assessed as 
highly relevant.  The reduction in total position backlog is the highest of any of the 
interventions modeled.  Additionally, the TL position's backlog time fell by 6.82% from 
the amount experienced in the baseline. 
7. Intervention 7—Retirement Intervention 
Intervention 7 simulates the effects on the HV Repair Cell if voluntary retirement 
incentives are offered to eligible mechanics over the next two fiscal years.  Table 11 
exhibits a comparison between the intervention and the baseline model.  The researchers 
predicted this intervention would not produce improvements in any of the eight output 
parameters because of the increased level of organizational stress experienced after 
retirements occur within the HV Repair Cell. 
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Baseline 
Model Intervention 7 % Change
Numerical Output
Starting Point Retirement
Simulated Project Duration (days) 34.32 35.03 2.06%
Direct Work Time (days) 130.52 130.52 0.00%
Indirect (Hidden) Work Time (days): 30.85 47.29 53.27%
Rework Time (days) 5.03 10.27 104.22%
Coordination Time (days) 18.31 22.06 20.50%
Exception-Handling Wait Time (days) 7.51 14.95 99.01%
Total Direct & Indirect (Hidden) Time (days) 161.38 177.81 10.18%
Total Project Cost ($) $60,627.98 $67,813.97 11.85%
Total Functional & Project Exception Time (days) 8.74 17.51 100.47%
Functional Exception Work (days) 7.95 15.99 101.08%
Project Exception Work (days) 0.77 1.51 94.27%
Project Risk 0.07 0.12 81.10%
Position Backlog (days) 2.87 2.97 3.55%




Aircraft Mechanic  
Table 11.   Comparison of Baseline Model and Intervention 7 
 
a. Simulated Project Duration.  The Intervention 7 results confirm the 
researchers' prediction, as total project duration increases from 34.32 days to 35.03 days 
(a rise of 5.66 hours).  This 2.06% increase from the baseline model is considered weakly 
relevant. 
b. Direct Work Time.  Similar to Interventions 1, 3, and 4, the amount of 
direct work time for Intervention 7 is equal to the baseline model (130.52 days).  This 
result implies modifying team experience, project exception probability, functional 
exception probability, and communication probability parameters does not influence the 
amount of direct work required during the HV repair process.  Also, the results indicate 
direct work is not affected if changes are not made to any task durations or assigned 
responsibilities. 
c. Indirect Work Time.  Unlike direct work time, modifying property 
parameters in Intervention 7 creates a higher total indirect time—up from 30.85 days to 
47.29 days.  This increase of 16.44 days shows a highly relevant difference of 53.27% 
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over the baseline model.  Rework time increases 104.22%; coordination time increases 
20.5%; and exception-handling wait time increases 99.01%.  These dramatic results 
suggest there is less team experience, a higher chance of functional and project 
exceptions, and an increased need to communicate.  As less-experienced members face 
more exceptions, it takes longer for them to perform rework and coordinate actions.  
Likewise, as they ask more questions, it takes longer for supervisors to attend to 
exception-handling queries. 
d. Total Direct and Indirect Work Time.  Total direct and indirect work time 
for Intervention 7 increases 10.18% to 177.81 days, from the baseline's work time of 
161.38 days.  This change is most likely driven by the 53.27% increase in total hidden 
work time discussed in the previous paragraph. 
e. Total Project Cost.  Total project cost for Intervention 7 rises over the 
baseline amount by 11.85%, from $60,627.98 to $67,813.97.  Additionally, this 
intervention shows the highest cost of all interventions and the baseline.  The increase in 
total project cost is attributed to elevated number of exceptions, rework, coordination, 
and exception-handling wait times. 
f. Total Functional and Project Exception Time.  Total functional and project 
exception time rises from 8.74 days to 17.51 days, a highly relevant difference of 
100.34%.  Functional exception work increases 101.08%, and project exception work 
increases 94.27%.  These increases contribute to higher overall exception-resolution time 
and severely affect waiting time as positions perform more rework, coordinate with each 
other, and generate exception-handling inquiries to supervisors. 
g. Project Risk.  As portrayed in Table 11, project risk for Intervention 7 is 
0.12.  This increase is 81.1% higher than the baseline's project risk of 0.07 and is 
considered highly relevant.  Most likely, elevated risk reflects the reduction in team 
experience, presence of more exceptions, and additional communication effort required to 
complete assigned tasks.  Higher project risk indicates a lower probability of successful 
HV Repair Cell integration, on average.  Moreover, Intervention 7 experiences the 
highest project risk value of the seven interventions modeled. 
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h. Position Backlog.  Lastly for Intervention 7, the AM2 position is the 
highest backlogged position, which is unchanged from the baseline model.  Although the 
amount of backlog increases from 2.87 days to 2.97 days, this 3.55% is assessed as 
weakly relevant.  This suggests that as stress on the flight controls repair process 
increases—brought on by retirement of three HV Repair Cell mechanics—the AM2 
position still experiences the highest backlog.  Additionally, the results indicate as 
experienced personnel leave the organization, the AM2 position should take longer to 
complete the linkage repair task. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study are provided to assist OC-ALC leaders with managing 
the KC-135 aircraft's Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM).  Modeling and simulation 
experimentation enables leaders to preview possible organizational design changes and 
subsequent outcomes before expending valuable resources.  Additionally, computational 
organizational modeling enables management to better understand troubling hotspot 
areas, assess whether or not expected risk is acceptable or unacceptable, and identify 
organizational design solutions to enhance the KC-135 flight controls repair process and 
throughput time. 
The organizational modeling and simulation results generated by this research 
increase flight controls repair visibility and supply an objective awareness for KC-135 
PDM decision-makers.  The more visualization and utility provided, the more apt leaders 
(the ultimate decision-makers) are to examine potential organizational design 
modifications and assess inherent tradeoffs prior to executing any changes.  The baseline 
model constructed for this study may be used by OC-ALC leaders as a starting point to 
provide quantitative and qualitative results of future HV Repair Cell organizational 
design initiatives.  Furthermore, the modeling results may validate organizational design 
adjustments leaders already believe will improve the HV Repair Cell, but are not 
thoroughly convinced or prepared to implement yet. 
By simulating multiple interventions for comparison against the current flight 
controls repair process (the baseline model), the authors facilitate the HV Repair Cell's 
efforts to manage project risk and conserve limited time, effort, and financial resources.  
Before implementing any design interventions shown to mitigate risk or decrease 
throughput time, HV Repair Cell leaders should consider implementation and opportunity 
costs.  Decision-makers should weigh the tradeoffs between time, HV repair quality 
(project risk), and cost. 
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For example, adding capacity to repair positions or resources needed for repair 
tasks may improve HV repair task completion and throughput time.  However, additional 
personnel may not be worth the requisite investment or infrastructure costs; thus, this 
option may not be a viable or optimal solution.  Moreover, if mechanics are already 
conducting repair tasks in the best possible way, one more mechanic could cause 
crowding on the HV Repair Cell's shop floor.  Congestion may result in decreased 
productivity and labor efficiency due to the law of diminishing marginal returns. 
Another critical factor the decision-makers should consider before executing 
organizational design modifications is project quality.  Overall, HV Repair Cell 
completion of the flight controls is closely tied to the number of functional and project 
exceptions encountered throughout the repair process.  Reassigning tasks within the HV 
Repair Cell from backlogged positions to less backlogged positions may be possible, but 
not the most feasible or practical alternative.  After task reassignment, tasks are not 
automatically accomplished more rapidly or without error if new personnel do not 
possess required skills or competency levels.  Hastily implementing task reassignments 
may trigger unnecessary functional and project exceptions, time-consuming rework, and 
eventually degrade overall project quality. 
While examining quality, project risk should also be assessed.  For instance, by 
changing decision-making policies or parameters, decision-makers may or may not 
improve repair cycle-time.  The modification of operating procedures may impact the 
level of risk throughout the repair process.  By changing the level of centralization from 
medium to low, decision-makers may accelerate the HV team's repair operations, but 
increase the amount of communication required and escalate risk to an unacceptable 
level. 
Conducting risk-management helps decision-makers prioritize and examine risks.  
Decisions regarding risks with potentially significant impact (e.g., if one component fails, 
the entire system fails) and high likelihood of occurrence should be addressed first.  Next, 
decision-makers should address risks with lower chances of occurrence and impact 
potential (e.g., one component fails causing other components to fail, but not total system 
failure).  Balancing risk within the HV Repair Cell may be difficult to measure, but is 
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imperative.  It is important to note the researcher's assumptions during model 
development drive the resulting project risk values for each intervention. 
Additionally, risk-management entails allocation of resources.  Decision-makers 
should assess the opportunity costs of sacrificing something to obtain something else.  
For example, resources dedicated to reducing HV Repair Cell risk may be better allocated 
to another repair cell (e.g., KC-135 Boom Repair Cell).  Again, the decision depends on 
the leaders' risk assessment.  Ideally, risk management minimizes investment costs while 
maximizing the reduction of negative risk effects. 
Decisions regarding speed versus risk and cost decisions are essential to optimal 
organizational design in the military operating environment.  Leaders must consider the 
relationship between organizational performance improvements (e.g., reduced project 
duration) and risk factors.  The Department of Defense emphasizes warfighter safety by 
managing risk.  Repaired HV assets installed on the KC-135 aircraft must perform in 
accordance with design characteristics, operating conditions, environmental constraints, 
and aircrew expectations. 
The demands of an aging KC-135 fleet and increasing operating and maintenance 
costs mandate flight controls repairs be of the highest quality.  Risking aircraft safety 
during refueling operations to save money or time during PDM is not an option.  The 
project's design of the flight controls repair process supports survivability, aircrew 
protection, and mission requirements by balancing cost and time reductions against 
project risk. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The simulation results of the seven interventions performed in this research 
provide 564 AMXS leaders an analysis of quantitative and qualitative information.   
Table 12 summarizes the rankings of the baseline and intervention models in the order of 
best output, second-best output, and third-best output. 
The table includes rankings for each of the eight output parameters closely 
examined in Chapter IV, Results section:  simulated project duration, direct work time, 
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indirect work time (including rework time, coordination time, exception-handling wait 
time), total direct and indirect work time, total project cost, total functional and project 
exception time (including functional exception work and project exception work), project 
risk, and position backlog. 
 
 
Table 12.   Ranking of Output Parameters for Baseline and Each Intervention 
 
By providing an analysis of the computational organization models simulated, the 
researchers (and other operators) can demonstrate objective awareness and draw attention 
to the importance of formal and informal communication flows and information 
processing.  The effective transfer and sharing of information about task accomplishment, 
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repair processes, and administrative procedures among and between workers is critical to 
achieving top-quality and timely flight controls repairs. 
To capitalize on this criticality and leverage the advantages of effective 
information-sharing, the researchers recommend the following measures be taken by HV 
Repair Cell leaders: 
1.  Address current hiring and operating regulations to pursue the allowance 
of formal cross-training within the HV Repair Cell. 
2. Continue with informal cross-training of aircraft and sheet metal 
mechanics within the HV Repair Cell.  Expand the number of cross-training tasks as time 
and effort permit. 
3. Train and fully qualify the nine aircraft mechanics in disassembly, repair 
linkages, and buildup tasks to create one highly skilled aircraft mechanic position. 
4.  Identify clear expectations and develop an "HV Repair Cell Transition 
Plan" to prepare organization as multiple employees become retirement-eligible. 
According to Table 12, Intervention 6 (a single, cross-trained mechanic resource 
pool) has the most number of "best output" parameters, ranking number one in six of the 
eight output parameters.  Most predominantly, the characteristics input into the 
Intervention 6 model generate the best output for project duration, direct time, total direct 
and indirect work time, project risk, and position backlog.  Within indirect work time, 
Intervention 6 has the lowest amount of rework, coordination, and exception-handling 
time. 
The output from Intervention 6 strongly supports cross-training within the HV 
Repair Cell.  OC-ALC leaders should pursue changing current hiring and operating 
regulations to permit formal cross-training.  In the interim, the researchers suggest the 
production supervisor and team leader continue with informal cross-training of aircraft 
and sheet metal mechanics.  The results from Intervention 6 may prove useful to 
objectively portray that potential benefits outweigh the cost of cross-training HV Repair 
Cell mechanics—including strongly significant time and risk improvements. 
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If the organization cannot negotiate formal cross-training into the CBA, the repair 
cell can still benefit from cross-training internally.  The advantages received from less 
rework time and exception-handling waiting should be balanced against the potential 
likelihood of more functional and project exception work.  Before implementing any 
changes, the HV production supervisor and team leader should recognize comfort levels 
may differ among employees learning new tasks and should understand the level of effort 
required to cross-train 9 aircraft mechanics and 14 sheet metal mechanics. 
Intervention 5 (combining Intervention 2b's single aircraft mechanic pool and 
Intervention 3's decentralized decision-making) has the best output for two parameters:  
project cost and total functional and project exception time.  This intervention is the 
second-best performing for direct work time, total direct and indirect time, and position 
backlog.  Additionally, Intervention 5 is the third-best performing intervention for project 
duration and indirect work time.  Within the indirect work-time parameter, Intervention 5 
also has the second lowest amount of rework and exception-handling wait time.  While 
Intervention 2b does not have the best output in any of the eight parameters, it does show 
excellent results for project duration, direct work time, total direct and indirect work time, 
project cost, functional exception work, and position backlog. 
Employment of Intervention 5's organizational characteristics requires a certain 
amount of training time and effort.  Therefore, the researchers recommend the HV Repair 
Cell begin to fully qualify and utilize all nine aircraft mechanics in the HV Repair Cell as 
soon as possible.  The two aircraft mechanics currently dedicated to the repair linkages 
task should be provided training on disassembly and buildup tasks.  This organizational 
change cannot be executed without adequate planning and should not occur too quickly.  
However, as low-level-skilled mechanics become medium-skilled and high-skilled 
personnel, the HV Repair Cell should be able to complete repairs more efficiently and 
rapidly. 
Additionally, decision-makers will require time, restraint and trust to decide and 
design how to decentralize decision-making authority and empower lower-level 
employees.  Lower levels of centralization cannot be realized without:  1) management 
taking effort to clearly explain supervisor expectations and "exceptions to the rule" if an 
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emergency arises, 2) supervisors believing in subordinates' skill-levels and exception-
handling abilities, and 3) leadership training and preparing mechanics sufficiently to 
make good decisions, ensuring flight controls repair quality does not suffer. 
Decentralized decision-making may only be achieved by a change in current 
behavior and commitment from higher-level supervisors.  If they excessively manage 
subordinates, organizational Interventions 3 and 5 will not succeed.  As the KC-135 fleet 
continues to age and demand increasingly complicated maintenance to keep it in the air, 
attempting to reduce turnaround time to the field at the expense of quality may not be 
worth the HV Repair Cell's cost to decentralize. 
The results of Intervention 7 (three eligible mechanics retire) underscore the 
complications organizations face as multiple employees become retirement-eligible and 
are incentivized to retire.  Before leaders move workers between divisions or 
organizations, they should consider the resulting percent of retirement-eligible personnel 
the moves will create.  Considering the findings from Intervention 7 could help decision-
makers explain the expected impact of future workforce reshaping efforts and help them 
mitigate undesirable consequences.  As the numbers of retirement-eligible federal civilian 
employees increase, dealing with this type of organizational design decision becomes 
both more difficult and more important for managers. 
Prior to implementing any of the aforementioned recommendations, OC-ALC 
decision-makers should review planned and ongoing process-improvement initiatives 
affecting horizontal and vertical stabilizer repair to identify any similarities to the 
interventions performed in this study. 
In addition to the specific recommendations provided to the HV Repair Cell, the 
authors urge leadership to conduct future computational organizational modeling and 
simulation research for similar USAF aircraft maintenance organizations or in other   
KC-135 PDM repair cells (e.g., boom or gear maintenance cells).  Further research 
should help decision-makers identify approaches that enrich information flow within the 
organizational structure and that enhance organizational performance, while they avoid 
undesirable effects and consequences before committing resources. 
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USAF transformation efforts improve warfighting capabilities to meet the ever-
changing demands of the military's dynamic and budget-constrained environment.  To 
satisfy these requirements, organizations should respond to demands quickly, maximize 
resources for sustainment and modernization, eliminate waste in organizational 
processes, and anticipate uncertainty wherever possible. 
Understanding the magnitude of formal and informal communication flows and 
information processing between personnel upon organizational performance is 
fundamental to mission success.  Effective communication and information-transfer 
between supervisors and subordinates directly impacts project completion, timeliness, 
and quality. 
In conclusion, the more visualization and transparency provided before executing 
potential organizational design modifications, the better prepared decision-makers will 
be.  The authors hope to provide value to their customer—the USAF—by highlighting 
and presenting the importance of computational organizational modeling.  Their hope is 
that future transformation and AFSO21 initiatives will adopt and employ this uniquely 
innovative type of modeling approach. 
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APPENDIX A. GENERAL PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS 




Work Day 480 min
Work Week 2400 min
Team Experience Medium N/A
Centralization Medium N/A
Formalization Medium N/A
Matrix Strength Medium N/A
Communication Probability 0.2 N/A
Noise Probability 0.01 N/A
Functional Exception Probability 0.05 N/A
Project Exception Probability 0.05 N/A
Number of Trials 1000 N/A  
B. INTERVENTION 3 AND INTERVENTION 5 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS
Priority Medium N/A
Work Day 480 min
Work Week 2400 min
Team Experience Medium N/A
Centralization Low N/A
Formalization Medium N/A
Matrix Strength Medium N/A
Communication Probability 0.20 N/A
Noise Probability 0.01 N/A
Functional Exception Probability 0.05 N/A
Project Exception Probability 0.05 N/A
Number of Trials 1000 N/A  
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C. INTERVENTION 4 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS
Priority Medium N/A
Work Day 480 min
Work Week 2400 min
Team Experience Medium N/A
Centralization Medium N/A
Formalization Medium N/A
Matrix Strength Medium N/A
Communication Probability 0.20 N/A
Noise Probability 0.01 N/A
Functional Exception Probability 0.10 N/A
Project Exception Probability 0.05 N/A
Number of Trials 1000 N/A  
D. INTERVENTION 7 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS
Priority Medium N/A
Work Day 480 min
Work Week 2400 min
Team Experience Low N/A
Centralization Medium N/A
Formalization Medium N/A
Matrix Strength Medium N/A
Communication Probability 0.40 N/A
Noise Probability 0.01 N/A
Functional Exception Probability 0.10 N/A
Project Exception Probability 0.10 N/A
Number of Trials 1000 N/A  
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MILESTONES, 





Update APTS- Location/Post for Wash/Paint 
Strip-H - ALS
1. APTS updated to show horizontal stabilizers  
wash task completed
2. Location updated at HV Repair Cell
Update APTS- Location/Ready for Wash/Paint 
Strip-V - ALS
1. APTS updated to show vertical stabilizer wash 
task completed
2. Location updated at HV Repair Cell
INSPECTION
Inspect & Repair Links - AM2
Horizontal and vertical stabilizer 
links are inspected and 
repaired
General HV Inspection - SM
1. Stabilizer inspection requirements include  
looking for: corrosion, missing items (e.g. bolts), 
cracks, wear, security, frozen/loose bearings, 
damage, general condition; delamination of 
fiberglass assemblies on the vertical stabilizer 
and honey comb panels on the horizontal 
stabilizers; checking the integrity of rubber hoses 
that carry hydraulic fluid, fasteners, antenna area 
on the vertical stabilizer, vertical and horizontal 
stabilizer attach points, access panels, lugholes, 
nut plates, and rubber cables
2. All discrepancies are recorded and determined 
if repair or replacement is required
3. Sheet metal technicians work with the Forward 
Logistics Specialist to order replacement parts
Prepare Aircraft Book - ALS
1. APTS updated to show 
horizontal stabilizers  wash task 
completed
2. Location updated at HV Repair 
Cell
Track Material/Parts Ordered - FLS
1. Track ordered material and parts and initiate 
follow-up action when necessary
2. Notify the PS and TL of all back-ordered parts
3. Notify the PS and TL of parts received
4. Maintain accountability of parts received until 



















Buildup of the horizontal stabilizers requires 
general installation; sealing of surfaces;, bearing 
grease and replacement; and installing the links, 







Buildup of the vertical stabilizer requires general 
installation; sealing of surfaces; bearing grease 
and replacement; and installing the links, balance 
bay panels, rudder, vertical stabilizer power 
control unit, and closeout panels
A-Zing/Feeder Line Transition - ALS
Ensures aircraft book is complete to include all 
WCDs are signed and stamped and Form 202s 
filed
Certify Buildup Complete - PS
1. Verifies and ensures all repairs finished and 
documentation complete
2. Certifies stabilizers are ready for reinstallation 
on the aircraft 
HV REPAIR COMPLETE
Stabilizers are moved to to the aircraft 
dock to await reinstallation  
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APPENDIX C. TASK PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS 
A. RECEIVE FLIGHT CONTROLS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Receive Flight Controls
Effort (Task Duration) 30
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
B.  PREPARE STRIP PACKAGE 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Prepare Strip Package
Effort (Task Duration) 30
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
C. UPDATE APTS—INITIAL 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update APTS—Initial
Effort (Task Duration) 15
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration











Effort (Task Duration) 2526
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume










Effort (Task Duration) 1326
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
F. PROCESS MATERIAL REQUEST RECORD/ORDER PARTS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Process Material Request Record/Order Parts
Effort (Task Duration) 142.5
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
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G. UPDATE APTS LOCATION/READY FOR WASH/PAINT STRIP—H 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update APTS Location/Ready for Wash/Paint Strip—H
Effort (Task Duration) 15
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
H. UPDATE APTS LOCATION/READY FOR WASH/PAINT STRIP—V 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update APTS Location/Ready for Wash/Paint Strip—V
Effort (Task Duration) 15
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
I. REPAIR LINKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Repair Links
Effort (Task Duration) 4032
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
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J. UPDATE APTS LOCATION/POST-WASH/PAINT STRIP—H 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update APTS Location/Post-wash/Paint Strip—H
Effort (Task Duration) 15
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
K. UPDATE APTS LOCATION/POST-WASH/PAINT STRIP—V 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update APTS Location/Post-wash/Paint Strip—V
Effort (Task Duration) 15
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
L. PREPARE AIRCRAFT BOOK 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Prepare Aircraft Book
Effort (Task Duration) 60
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
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M. TRACK MATERIAL/PARTS ORDERED 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Track Material/Parts Ordered
Effort (Task Duration) 30
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
N. UPDATE PDMSS—LUG PRIORITIES 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update PDMSS—Lug Priorities
Effort (Task Duration) 30
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
O. REMOVE BUSHINGS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Remove Bushings
Effort (Task Duration) 216
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
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P. REMOVE GREASE & BUFF 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Remove Grease & Buff
Effort (Task Duration) 180
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
Q. LUG INSPECTION & 202 PREPARE—H 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Lug Inspection & 202 Prepare—H
Effort (Task Duration) 596
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
R. 202 REVIEW/VALIDATE/BUILD WCDS—LUGS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name 202 Review/Validate/Build WCDs—Lugs
Effort (Task Duration) 100
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
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S. AMMONIUM PERSULPHATE 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Ammonium Persulphate
Effort (Task Duration) 504
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
T. UPDATE PDMSS LUGS COMPLETE 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Update PDMSS Lugs Complete
Effort (Task Duration) 20
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
U. LUG INSPECTION—V 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Lug Inspection—V
Effort (Task Duration) 216
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume











Effort (Task Duration) 960
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
W. 202S—PREPARED 70% OF TIME 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name 202s—Prepared 70% of Time
Effort (Task Duration) 14
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
X. 202 REVIEW/VALIDATE (70%)/BUILD WCDS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name 202 Review/Validate (70%)/Build W CDs
Effort (Task Duration) 70
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
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Y. AVG REPAIR—H 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Avg Repair—H
Effort (Task Duration) 19674
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
Z. INSPECTION-V/REPAIR—V 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Inspection—V/ Repair—V
Effort (Task Duration) 6270
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume










Effort (Task Duration) 9534
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume











Effort (Task Duration) 6714
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-volume






Fixed Cost 0  
AC. A-ZING/FEEDER LINE TRANSITION 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name A-Zing/Feeder Line Transition
Effort (Task Duration) 120
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
AD. CERTIFY BUILDUP COMPLETE 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name Certify Buildup Complete
Effort (Task Duration) 1
Effort Units minutes
Effort Type W ork-duration






Fixed Cost 0  
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AE. ALS' NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name ALS' Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
AF. FLS' NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name FLS' Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
AG. PN'S NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name PN's Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
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AH. TL'S NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name TL's Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
AI. AM2'S NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name AM2's Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
AJ. AM7'S NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name AM7's Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
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AK. SM'S NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name SM's Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 1260
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
AL. PS' NON-TOUCH TASKS 
PROPERTY VALUE
Task Name PS' Non-touch Tasks
Effort (Task Duration) 430
Effort Units minutes







Fixed Cost 0  
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APPENDIX D. TIME-LAG PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS TO 
ACCOUNT FOR TIME DELAYS BETWEEN HV REPAIR TASKS 
PERFORMED BY OUTSIDE REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS 
A. TIME DELAY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO WASH/CHEMICAL STRIP 
FACILITY AND WASH/CHEMICAL STRIPPING OF HORIZONTAL 
STABILIZER 
PROPERTY VALUE
From Update APTS Location/Ready for Wash/Paint Strip—H
To Wash/Paint Strip Complete—H
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 2400 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For Transportation personnel move the horizontal stabilizers to and from the wash rack.Wash Rack technicians wash or chemically strip the horizontal stabilizer.  
B. TIME DELAY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO WASH/CHEMICAL STRIP 
FACILITY AND WASH/CHEMICAL STRIPPING OF VERTICAL 
STABILIZER 
PROPERTY VALUE
From Update APTS Location/Ready for Wash/Paint Strip—V
To Wash/Paint Strip Complete—V
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 2400 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For Transportation personnel move the vertical stabilizers to and from the wash rack.Wash Rack technicians wash or chemically strip the vertical stabilizer.  
C. TIME DELAY FOR NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION (NDI) 
TECHNICIAN REPAIRS ON LUGS 
PROPERTY VALUE
From Update PDMSS—Lug Priorities
To Remove Bushings
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 492 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For
Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) technicians spot weld skin splice joints, spars and 
surfaces during horizontal stabilizer lug repair.  




To Remove Grease & Buff
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 204 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For Wash Rack personnel chemically strip the lug areas on the horizontal stabilizers.  
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E. TIME DELAY FOR DISPATCHED MACHINISTS AND NDI 
TECHNICIAN REPAIRS ON LUGS 
PROPERTY VALUE
From 202 Review/Validate/Build WCDs—Lugs
To Ammonium Persulphate
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 2196 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For
Dispatched machinists spot face to remove corrosion on upper and lower lug holes 
on horizontal stabilizers.
NDI personnel perform a magnetic particle inspection of lug surfaces and holes 
looking for cracks.  
F. TIME DELAY FOR WASH/CHEMICAL STRIP TECHNICIAN AND 
DISPATCHED MACHINISTS REPAIRS ON LUGS 
PROPERTY VALUE
From Ammonium Persulphate
To Update PDMSS Lugs Complete
Precedence Finish—Start
Time Lag 1506 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For
Wash rack personnel shot peen with steel shot media all reworked surfaces on the 
horizontal stabilizer.
Cadmium plate technicians brush all Cadmium plate steel parts using a low 
Hydrogen embrittlement process.
Dispatched machinists install new bushings in the lug holes of the stabilizers.  
G. TIME DELAY FOR WASH/CHEMICAL STRIP TECHNICIAN AND 





Time Lag 1080 minutes
Task(s) Time Lag Accounts For
Wash rack personnel shot peen with steel shot media all reworked surfaces on the 
vertical stabilizer.
Cadmium plate technicians brush all Cadmium plate steel parts using a low 
Hydrogen embrittlement process.  
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APPENDIX E. POSITION PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS  
A.  PS—PRODUCTION SUPERVISOR 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position PS—HV Production Supervisor N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role PM N/A
App Exp Medium N/A
FTE 1.0 FTE
Salary 50 FTE/hr
Skill Ratings 202 Skills—High
Aircraft Mechanic Skills—High 








B. TL—TEAM LEADER 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position TL—Team Leader N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role SL N/A





Aircraft Mechanic Skills—High 
Flight Controls Acceptance Skill—High
FLS Skills—Medium
Generic—Medium








App Exp Medium N/A
FTE 0.8 FTE
Salary 50 FTE/hr

















E. FLS—FORWARD LOGISTICS SPECIALIST/MATERIAL CONTROL 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position FLS—Forward Logistics Specialist N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role ST N/A
App Exp Medium N/A
FTE 0.8 FTE
Salary 50 FTE/hr




F. AM7—AIRCRAFT MECHANIC 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position AM7—Aircraft Mechanic N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role ST N/A
App Exp Medium N/A
FTE 1.0 FTE
Salary 50 FTE/hr




G. AM2—AIRCRAFT MECHANIC 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position AM2—Link Aircraft Mechanic N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role ST N/A
App Exp Medium N/A
FTE 1.0 FTE
Salary 50 FTE/hr





H. SM—SHEET METAL MECHANIC 
PROPERTY VALUE UNIT
Position SM—Sheet Metal Mechanic N/A
Culture Generic N/A
Role ST N/A
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APPENDIX F. MEETING PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS 
A. DAILY ROLL CALL MEETING 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS






Meeting Time 0 hrs
First-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
First-lag 0 days
Last-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
Last-lag 0 days
POSITION ALLOCATION
Attendees AM2—Links Aircraft Mechanic 1
AM7—Aircraft Mechanic 1
PS—Production Supervisor 1
SM—Sheet Metal Mechanic 1
TL—Team Leader 1  
B. DAILY TURNOVER MEETING 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS






Meeting Time 7.5 hrs
First-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
First-lag 0 days
Last-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
Last-lag 0 days
POSITION ALLOCATION
Attendees PS—Production Supervisor 1  
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C. DAILY TAIL TEAM MEETING 
PROPERTY VALUE UNITS
Meeting Name Daily Tail Team Meeting N/A
Priority High N/A
Duration 15 mins min
Interval 1.0 day day
Repeating True N/A
Schedule-till-end True N/A
Meeting Time 1.5 hrs hrs
First-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
First-lag 0 days days
Last-milestone Acceptance Complete N/A
Last-lag 0 days days
POSITION ALLOCATION
Attendees ALS—Scheduler 1
FLS—Forward Logistics Specialist 1
PN—Planner 1
PS—Production Supervisor 1  
 131
APPENDIX G. REWORK LINK PROPERTY PANEL SETTINGS 
A. REWORK LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF HORIZONTAL 
STABILIZER TO AVERAGE REPAIR OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER 
FROM TO STRENGTH
Disassembly—H Avg Repair—H 0.0030
 
B. REWORK LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF VERTICAL STABILIZER 
TO INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF VERTICAL STABILIZER 
FROM TO STRENGTH
Disassembly—V Inspection—V/ Repair—V 0.0096
 
C. REWORK LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF HORIZONTAL 
STABILIZER TO REPAIR LINKAGES 
FROM TO STRENGTH
Disassembly—H Repair Links 0.0074
 
D. REWORK LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF VERTICAL STABILIZER 
TO REPAIR LINKAGES 
FROM TO STRENGTH
Disassembly—V Repair Links 0.0074
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APPENDIX H. COMMUNICATION LINK PROPERTY PANEL 
SETTINGS 
A. COMMUNICATION LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF HORIZONTAL 




B. COMMUNICATION LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF VERTICAL 





C. COMMUNICATION LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF HORIZONTAL 




D. COMMUNICATION LINK FROM DISASSEMBLY OF VERTICAL 
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APPENDIX I. KNOWLEDGE LINK PROPERTY PANEL 
SETTINGS 
A. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM TEAM LEADER TO PRODUCTION 
SUPERVISOR 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
TL—Team Leader PS—HV Production Supervisor 202 Skills High
Aircraft Mechanic Skills High
FLS Skills Medium
Flight Controls Acceptance Skills High
Sheet Metal Mechanic Skills High
 
B. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM PLANNER TO TEAM LEADER 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
PN—Planner TL-Team Leader 202 Skills High
 
C. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM SCHEDULER TO PRODUCTION 
SUPERVISOR 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
ALS—Scheduler PS—HV Production Supervisor Scheduling Skills Medium
 
D. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM FORWARD LOGISTICS SPECIALIST TO 
TEAM LEADER 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
FLS—Forward Logistics 
Specialist TL—Team Leader FLS Skills Medium
 
E. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM AIRCRAFT MECHANIC TO TEAM 
LEADER 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
AM7—Aircraft Mechanic TL—Team Leader Aircraft Mechanic Skills High
 
 
F. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM LINK AIRCRAFT MECHANIC TO TEAM 
LEADER 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
AM2-Link Aircraft Mechanic TL-Team Leader Aircraft Mechanic Skills High
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G. KNOWLEDGE LINK FROM SHEET METAL MECHANIC TO TEAM 
LEADER 
FROM TO SKILL RATING
SM-Sheet Metal Mechanic TL-Team Leader Sheet Metal Mechanic Skills High
 
 137
APPENDIX J. INTERVENTION RESULTS 
A. OUTPUT PARAMETERS, NUMERICAL COMPARISON TO BASELINE 
 
B. OUTPUT PARAMETERS, RELATIVE DIFFERENCE 
(INCREASE/DECREASE) TO BASELINE 
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C. OUTPUT PARAMETERS, NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE FROM 
BASELINE IN DAYS 
 
D. OUTPUT PARAMETERS, NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE FROM 
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